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THE CALL TO WITNESS:  
HISTORICAL DIVIDES, LITERARY 
NARRATIVE, AND THE POWER OF OATH 
NANCY COOK* 
A decade ago, in her book, Narrative, Authority and Law, Robin 
West posed these questions:  How might we develop a moral sensibility 
with which to criticize law that is independent of the influence of law?  
How should we criticize law from a moral point of view, given the 
influence of law over our moral beliefs?  What is the role of narrative in 
this enterprise? 
The “Call to Witness” is an entreaty to look to narratives as acts of 
witness for a partial answer to these questions.  Narratives bring to light 
the real conflicts underlying court cases and law, the motives that are 
dismissed as irrelevant, and the ever-present ambiguity of circumstances.  
Picking up at key moments in time before or after the law is invoked, 
stories demonstrate the consequences of our actions and the agonizing 
responsibilities of choice.  These are the stories people want to tell, but 
cannot in the confines of the legal system, and the stories people are afraid 
to tell, but recognize as crucial to justice. 
If narrativity is a necessary part of moral claims made on behalf of 
those traditionally excluded from processes of law, and if the telling of 
heretofore silenced experiences in narrative form is essential to correcting 
the imbalance, lawyers must be engaged in the narrative process.  
Certainly, lawyers are well positioned to serve as witnesses to the 
operations of law and justice institutions in society.  The Article examines 
the meanings that might be attached to the witness role and the ways in 
which such a role might be performed.  The contextual lenses of legal 
history and literary testimonial narrative provide the mechanisms through 
which concepts of witnessing can be analyzed and understood. 
 
*  Vaughan G. Papke Professor of Clinical Law, University of Minnesota.  People too 
numerous to name have provided feedback and suggestions over the long gestation of this 
article.  I am especially thankful to friends and colleagues at Roger Williams University 
School of Law who worked through early drafts with me.  Also of real value were workshops 
at the University of Baltimore’s Feminist Legal Theory Conference and at the AALS 
Conference on Clinical Legal Education’s Scholarship Roundtable. 
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The position of lawyers in the social order provides them with the 
opportunity, and a privileged position from which, to testify.  Legal 
history affords some clues as to how this might be accomplished, but 
narrative theories provide significantly greater guidance.  What history 
demonstrates is that both in the way it frames and focuses the search and 
in the way it defines and limits roles, the law has evolved over time to 
assure that facts, if not truth, will be obscured in the judicial system.  Long 
ago, legal developments led to strict limitations on the role witnesses play 
in the system and, consequently, on the role of lawyers in the system.  
Thus, a different construct is called for. 
Literary and narrative theories provide the best strategies for 
communicating and otherwise breaching the gaps between what is 
experienced and what is understood by the community to be truth.  
Narrativists have explored the relationships between primary subject and 
listener or observer, and they are concerned with form and process and 
their attendant ramifications for truth.  They can instruct our ideas about 
how we relate to client populations, especially those least well served by 
the existing judicial system.  Literary analysts have also addressed the 
ethical implications involved in telling and, more importantly, re-telling.  
These are all matters that concern lawyers. 
While narrative theory is emphasized in the analysis of witness role 
and method, another essential historical element in law and history brings 
the discussion full circle.  It is not just the act of bearing witness, facilitated 
by lawyers’ professional privileges, that can make a difference, but the 
promise of truth—a covenant, a sacred oath—that signals and constitutes 
a return to authentic witnessing.  Here the oath is shown to be a key 
connector between the lawyer’s role as advocate and the lawyer’s role as 
public citizen, between courtroom narrative and testimony, and between 
storytelling and truth. 
Using literary narrative witnessing strategies, lawyers can shed light on 
hidden aspects of the justice system and on laws’ effects.  Lawyers should 
therefore take a serious look at the role of witnesses in society, not in the 
isolated and confining context of the judicial system but in the community 
at large, where we all have an interest in, and responsibility for, nurturing 
truth. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
More than two decades ago, in her book, Narrative, Authority and 
Law, Robin West posed these provocative questions: 
“[Do the] goals and the laws we enact that reflect them well serve 
our best understanding of our true human needs, our true human 
aspirations, or our true social and individual potential, as gleaned 
from the stories we tell . . . [?]”1 
“How might we develop a moral sensibility with which to criticize 
law that is . . . independent of the influence of law?”2 
“How should we criticize law from a moral point of view, given the 
influence of law . . . over our moral beliefs?”3 
West, who has been described as more of a theorist of stories than 
storyteller,4 offered a few suggestions for moving ahead on the agenda.  
First she noted that “traditional methods” of humanism—“writing, 
reading, and responding to narrative texts”—are “at least a partial 
answer.”5  She added that critiques should not be limited to law itself 
but should encompass the commonly shared moral beliefs with which we 
typically engage in criticism.6  In her words, what is needed is “careful, 
 
1.  ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 7 (1993). 
2.  Id. at 6. 
3.  Id. at 2. 
4.  L.H. LaRue, West on Story and Theory, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1786, 1790 (1994); see also 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and _____ Really Seriously: Before, During and After 
“The Law,” 60 VAND. L. REV. 555, 573 (2007) (reviewing WEST, supra note 1) (describing the 
work of West, among others, as a “more highbrow form of legal literary analysis”). 
5.  WEST, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
6.  Id. at 6. 
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systematic study of the narratives and critiques of narratives that we tell 
each other about the substance of our lives.”7  One conclusion West 
reached was that the imbalance in narrative created by inequality, 
including inequality in narrative resources and power, “must be 
corrected by the telling in narrative form of the heretofore silenced 
experiences.”8 
West’s questions remain unanswered, although certainly they have 
provoked much discussion.9  The continuing call for publication of 
silenced and underrepresented voices haunts us with its failures to 
rectify the imbalance about which West and others have written.  In this 
Article, I offer a new perspective on the problem, with a proposal that 
takes into account the power of narrative, the historical constraints of 
legal process,10 the underpinnings of commonly shared moral beliefs, the 
all but forgotten significance of oaths, and the “illusive, partial, 
interpretable, . . . and, most importantly, complex” nature of truth.11  
The focal point for the analysis is the concept of “witness.” 
A. The Problem: Lost Story and Truth 
This investigation into the concept of witnessing looks well beyond 
conventional roles assigned to players in the modern American judicial 
system, taking cognizance of the fact that, while lawyers may be 
instrumental in the production of courtroom testimony, in the course of 
their lawyering work, lawyers are also outsider observers of client lives 
and insider observers of legal institutions and operations.  
Consequently, the search for truth that lawyers, as participants in the 
legal system, are presumably engaged in must paradoxically expand 
beyond the confines of the legal profession’s truth-seeking model if 
truth is to be the outcome. 
Without question, lawyers provide support for witnesses within the 
judicial system.  Yet despite the fact that throughout history some 
 
7.  Id.  
8.  Id. at 10. 
9.  See, e.g., IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE: POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES 
22–23 (1995); Rob Atkinson, Law as a Learned Profession: The Forgotten Mission Field of the 
Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C. L. REV. 621, 652–53 (2001); LaRue, supra note 4; Barbara 
Stark, Bottom Line Feminist Theory: The Dream of a Common Language, 23 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 227, 236 (2000). 
10.  See Anthony V. Alfieri, Gideon in White/Gideon in Black: Race and Identity in 
Lawyering, 114 YALE L.J. 1459, 1462–63 (2005). 
11.  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a 
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 5 (1996). 
 2015] THE CALL TO WITNESS 1589 
lawyers and witnesses have demonstrated considerable creativity and 
resourcefulness in the courts, most revelations there are circumscribed.  
In the courtroom, witnesses are called upon to speak of what they have 
seen.  What they have seen, and profess to know firsthand, however, is 
often understood in relation to what they “knew” previously.12  
Courtroom witnesses in some sense possess the “truth” before they are 
observers of legally relevant events; in most cases, they conform new 
knowledge to the old.13  Receptivity to information is dependent on and 
reflective of existing collective “knowledge.”  When performing their 
juridical roles, therefore, witnesses tend to draw on this accepted truth 
or knowledge, resulting, more often than not, in an affirmation or 
perpetuation of preexisting knowledge paradigms.  Jurors and judges do 
the same.  
Many lawyers have reflected on the gap between what passes for 
truth in the judicial system and what goes on in clients’ lives.14  Robert 
Cover, for example, in his groundbreaking work on narrative, notes the 
dissonance between official systems of justice and the normative worlds 
 
12.  C.A.J. COADY, TESTIMONY: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 262–63 (1992) (noting that 
psychological critiques of eyewitness testimony reflect extensive reliance on the word of 
others in assessing truth). 
13.  Even knowledge obtained through direct experience will be rejected if it conflicts 
with what one already understands to be true.  DARREN OLDRIDGE, STRANGE HISTORIES 
169 (2005).  
14.  See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Black Women’s Stories and the Criminal Law: Restating 
the Power of Narrative, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 941, 945–46 (2006) (“[N]arrative [is] . . . 
essential to the project of charting the space between law as it is imagined and law as it is 
experienced.”); Nancy L. Cook, In Celia’s Defense: Transforming the Story of Property 
Acquisition in Sexual Harassment Cases into a Feminist Castle Doctrine, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 197 (1999) (illustrating impossibility of portraying client’s truth by utilizing sexual 
harassment defense in a criminal assault case); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
1241 (1991) (looking at representative inadequacies in portraying lives of black women); 
Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2459 (1989) (analyzing misunderstandings in interactions between the court and a 
Spanish-speaking defendant and between lawyers and the defendant-client who dismissed the 
lawyers); Carolyn Grose, A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients’ Stories, 12 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 329 (2006) (addressing problems in transgendered client representation); Tamara F. 
Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon Martin Killing: 
The Public Outcry, the Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law, 23 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271 (2012) (inadequacy of trial narrative in the Trayvon Martin case); 
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 6 (critique of adversary system arises from observation 
that binary representation oversimplifies, leaves much out, and is not the best way to 
ascertain truth); Karen J. Sneddon, Speaking for the Dead: Voice in Last Wills and 
Testaments, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 683 (2011) (discussing issues in context of clients’ wills). 
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in which people live.15  Interactions with client populations in some 
instances reportedly bear no resemblance to either the ways their stories 
play out in courtrooms or the ways their lives are portrayed by judges 
and other professional players in the justice system.16  The pressure to 
conform client stories to certain patterns and stereotypes can be 
frustrating;17 indeed, the “perceived tenuousness of the connection 
between the concrete immediate injustices of practice and the remote 
justice that is supposed to redeem,” says William Simon, is cause for 
“moral anxiety.”18  Much has been written about the importance of 
letting clients tell their own stories in their own ways.19  But lawyers 
know, and usually clients know, they do so at some risk.  Telling the 
client’s story the client’s way often has costs.20  The real stories are too 
 
15.  Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). 
16.  See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons 
of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) (demonstrating how normative content of 
client’s story falsified by advocate); Evelyn H. Cruz, Validation Through Other Means: How 
Immigration Clinics Can Give Immigrants a Voice When Bureaucracy Has Left Them 
Speechless, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 811 (2005) (addressing problem of loss of truth in 
immigration cases); Jane K. Stoever, Stories Absent from the Courtroom: Responding to 
Domestic Violence in the Context of HIV and AIDS, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1157 (2009) (addressing 
limitations on truth telling in domestic violence litigation); Lucie E. White, Subordination, 
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1 (1990) (contrasting and analyzing lawyer’s portrayal and client’s portrayal of client’s 
situation in welfare case). 
17.  See, e.g., Nancy Cook, Legal Fictions: Clinical Experiences, Lace Collars and 
Boundless Stories, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 41, 52 (1994) (describing pressure to present client 
story “in a way a judge would understand”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 
57 U. PITT. L. REV. 477 (1996) (describing pressures in representing victims of domestic 
violence).  As Tony Alfieri observes, lawyers may find that when they achieve legal victories 
while staying within the constraints of legal process, they do so “at the expense of democratic 
empowerment and minority collaboration.”  Alfieri, supra note 10, at 1463. 
18.  WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 
3 (1998). 
19.  See, e.g., Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Legal Representation and the Next Steps Toward 
Client Control: Attorney Malpractice for the Failure to Allow the Client to Control Negotiation 
and Pursue Alternatives to Litigation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 819 (1990); Herbert A. 
Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 
763 (1995); Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the Lawyer–Client Relationship: A Search for Equality 
and Collaboration, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 71 (1996); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: 
Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994); Binny Miller, 
Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 
(2000). 
20.  Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 
971 (1992) (examining situation in which client in criminal case elected to forego plea offer 
and go to trial to tell story despite lack of legally cognizable defense); see also William H. 
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long, too complex, and, frankly, too depressing.  Of much of life it might 
be said that knowledge, truth, story, and reality are fluid, contingent, 
and relative, but in the judicial system there is little appreciation for 
that.  Nuanced tales do not script well in trial settings.21 
In addition, for lawyers, the witness role has meaning that extends 
outside the parameters of the judicial system and well into the social 
milieu.  Lawyers apprehend client experiences that never get public 
disclosure; they are also intimate observers of the legal system in 
operation.  In other words, they are themselves witnesses.  Because of 
this, in both direct and collateral ways, lawyers have access to 
information that is, strictly speaking, only peripherally related to legal 
proceedings.  That same information, however, could have significant 
value to a citizenry that understands how acts of narration create 
functional history, and to a society in which, over time, functional 
history operates as, and then becomes, accepted “truth.”  If, as Robin 
West concludes, narrativity is a necessary part of moral claims for 
change made on behalf of those traditionally excluded from processes of 
law, and if the telling of heretofore silenced experiences in narrative 
form is essential to correcting the imbalance,22 lawyers must be engaged 
in the narrative process.  Certainly, lawyers are well positioned to serve 
as witnesses to the operations of law and justice institutions in society.  
For that to proceed in a principled fashion, it is necessary to examine 
what meanings are attached to the witness role and how such a role 
might be performed. 
Part II of this Article covers some definitional foundations by which 
concepts of witnessing can be analyzed and understood.23  Part III looks 
at witnessing specifically through the lens of legal history.  What this 
history demonstrates is that, both in the way it frames and focuses the 
search and in the way it defines and limits roles, the law has evolved 
over time to function with a narrow scope.  In American courts, even if 
witnesses were not dependent on pre-existing “knowledge” or 
influenced by other sources, they would not often be able to make a full 
disclosure of what they know.  Historical turns have almost assured that 
 
Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 213–16 
(1991) (describing struggle over alternative ways to balance client’s desire for truth and 
justice with practical exigencies of plea bargain).   
21.  Carrie Menkel-Meadow has argued that the adversary system may be outdated for 
essentially this reason.  Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 5. 
22.  WEST, supra note 1, at 10. 
23.  See infra Part II. 
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facts, if not truth, will be obscured in the judicial system.  Long ago, 
legal developments led to strict limitations on the role witnesses play in 
the system and, consequently, on the role of lawyers in the system.24 
In Part IV, I explore the literary narrative tradition of witnessing.25  
Literary and narrative theories have significantly aided our 
understanding of witnesses.  Theories of testimonial narrative have 
developed around multiple aspects of the process of telling.  They have 
explored the relationships between primary subject and listener or 
observer, and they are concerned with form and process and their 
attendant ramifications for truth.  Literary analysis has also addressed 
the ethical implications involved in telling and, more importantly, re-
telling.  These are all matters that concern lawyers. 
Part V develops the idea that current literary testimonial narrative 
can serve as a model for lawyer witnessing.26  Historical parallels and 
similarities in purposes and issues are drawn.  This Part includes an 
exploration of civic and professional values, a careful look at the 
underlying concept of “truth telling,” and an analysis of the role that 
oaths have played.  Part VI concludes with a “Call to Witness,” with 
specific reference to using literary narrative strategies to bring to light 
hidden aspects of the justice system and the law’s effects.27 
II. DEFINITIONAL FOUNDATIONS  
Postmodernism has invested testimony with legitimacy as discursive 
practice.28  As used here, “testimony” denotes simply the act of relating 
what one has seen or heard.  The actor in this construct is generally 
referred to as the “witness.”  Because testimony is utilized to preserve 
experience and is relied on in the historical construction of truth, it is 
recognized as being central to the conscientious care of memory and 
truth.29  Thus, authorship of testimony—the act of witness—is 
commonly viewed as an act of personal and civic responsibility.   
 
24.  See infra Part III. 
25.  See infra Part IV. 
26.  See infra Part V. 
27.  See infra Part VI. 
28.  LINDA J. CRAFT, NOVELS OF TESTIMONY AND RESISTANCE FROM CENTRAL 
AMERICA 6, 17 (1997). 
29.  PAUL RICOEUR, The Hermeneutics of Testimony (David Stewart & Charles E. 
Reagan trans., 1972) [hereinafter RICOEUR, Hermeneutics of Testimony], in ESSAYS ON 
BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION 119, 123–24 (Lewis S. Mudge ed., 1980). 
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The term “witness,” when used as a verb, generally signifies one of 
two things in modern parlance: to behold or to attest.30  The word 
“behold,” meaning to take in and to perceive, could be considered 
passive;31 the word “attest” is clearly active, meaning to give out, to 
testify.32  One form of the verb focuses on those who see and, in 
response, give credence to their perceptions; the other situates the 
action in those who speak and, in so doing, touch others.  
Although it proceeds from the “irreplaceable performance of the act 
of seeing,”33 as a matter of public duty, witnessing involves more than 
movement from seeing/hearing to comprehension in the “behold” sense 
of the word.  Witness is not merely an act of reproduction; it is an act of 
transmission.  Thus, “testimony is not perception itself but the 
report, . . . the story, the narration of the event.”34  The task for the 
witness is to transfer things seen to the level of things said, as honestly as 
possible.35  
Once the witness moves to narration, and ownership of story is 
assumed, “testimony is at the service of judgment.”36  This is so because 
the act of testifying places the testimony into the care of listeners and 
thereby becomes subject to interpretation and change.37  Narrating 
witnesses are engaged in a complex process, capturing primary 
perception or experience with words, communicating that perception or 
experience to others, and subjecting the process of telling to analysis.38  
It is no linguistic accident that those who give testimony are often said 
to “bear witness.”  “Bearing witness” implies something more than 
 
30.  THOMAS G. LONG, THE WITNESS OF PREACHING 78 (1989). 
31.  Long frames it as active: “to be present and active as an observer.”  Id. 
32.  Id.  Long adds the meaning “making others aware.”  Id. 
33.  SHOSHANA FELMAN, The Return of the Voice: Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah 
[hereinafter FELMAN, Return of the Voice], in SHOSHANA FELMAN & DORI LAUB, 
TESTIMONY: CRISES OF WITNESSING IN LITERATURE, PSYCHOANALYSIS, AND HISTORY 
[hereinafter TESTIMONY] 204, 206 (1992). 
34.  RICOEUR, Hermeneutics of Testimony, supra note 29, at 123. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Franca Molino Signorini, The Duty and Risk of Testimony: Primo Levi as Keeper of 
Memory, in MEMORY AND MASTERY: PRIMO LEVI AS WRITER AND WITNESS 173, 178 
(Roberta S. Kremer ed., 2001). 
38.  See DORI LAUB, An Event Without a Witness: Truth, Testimony and Survival 
[hereinafter LAUB, Event Without Witness], in TESTIMONY, supra note 33, at 75, 75. 
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testifying does; it denotes gravity, weight, consequence.39  It suggests 
that testimony is formative and not just informative.40  For this reason, 
testimony is recognized in history, literature, and religion as serving 
truth not only through preservation of historical memory but by virtue 
of its creative and potentially transformative properties. 
These notions are deeply embedded in law.  In all respects testimony 
is, or certainly should be, the concern of lawyers.  The legal system—the 
adversarial trial system in particular—is intended to be a search for 
truth.  Lawyers are invested, and thus implicated, in this profession that 
currently supports as truth the pronouncements of judges and jurors,41 
designated factfinders who rely on the testimony of a kinship body of 
oath-takers, i.e., witnesses.42  The lawyers are not mere technicians in 
the judicial process, identifying witnesses, documents, and tangible 
evidence to be plugged into a truth-finding machine; they are 
instrumental in producing or shaping testimony, the product of 
witnessing.  They have the power to make or direct choices determining 
whether the judicial system operates more as a restrained editorial 
board on truth or as a public forum on matters of concern to the 
community.  In some cases, lawyers can lay the groundwork for the 
future, ensuring that controversial or unaccepted evidence is recorded, 
even if the facts are not acknowledged or recognized as such.  In these 
ways, lawyers are already engaged in discovering and shaping truth 
through the use of testimony.  The related question is whether lawyers, 
who are positioned to witness (as in behold) so much about society, and 
have the social authority to witness (as in attest to) what they have seen, 
are uniquely qualified to assume a civic, testimonial role with respect to 
the operations of law and aspirations for justice in society.  The 
 
39.  Anne P. Rice, Introduction to WITNESSING LYNCHING: AMERICAN WRITERS 
RESPOND 1, 23 (Anne P. Rice ed., 2003) [hereinafter WITNESSING LYNCHING] (“[L]iterary 
text carries the burden of remembering . . . .”). 
40.  Signorini, supra note 37, at 193. 
41.  Etymologically, those who fulfill a promise.  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD 
DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1011 (David B. Guralnik & Joseph H. Friend 
eds., college ed. 1968) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY].  It should be noted that the 
root of “jury” is same as that for “oath,” and the “basic sense” of root words for oath is “a 
going to fulfill a promise.”  Id. at 795, 1011. 
42.  Etymologically, those who see or know.  Id. at 1680; see also id. at 1678, 1680 
(showing that the root of “witness” is knowledge and that “witness” is derivative of “wit”; also 
refers to “wise” for etymological root, identifying Middle English, Anglo-Saxon, and Indo-
European roots of “wise” as signifying “see” and “know,” and Latin root as meaning “to 
see”); 2 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 3659 (5th 
ed. 2002) (identifying root of “witness” as Indo-European base “weid,” meaning “to see”). 
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contextual lenses of legal history and literature provide insights that aid 
the resolution of that question. 
III. LEGAL HISTORY LENS.   
A pervasive notion, especially in the United States, is that “law” is 
best understood as a series of authoritative texts.43  These texts 
presumably have acquired authority by means of a lengthy, mostly 
logical, and representative process.  To the extent that the law has been 
thus arrived at through participative methods, it can be considered 
democratic.  Hence, legal texts can be codified to inject a strong 
measure of validity to substantive rights and processes.  In large part, 
historians rely on this conception since they, like most people, prefer to 
think of law as “embodied in authoritative texts whose authority is 
external to us.”44  
But the idea of law as text obscures the actual processes by which 
laws are both devised and applied.45  The formal rules are a small part of 
what the law is.  An outgrowth of communal human relations, law in 
operation is, essentially, social interaction.46  There would, indeed, be no 
law without the social conditions to which it is applicable.47  This has 
material implications in the history and tradition of witnessing.  The role 
of witnesses in western law is better traced through the changes in 
societal relationships than through textual developments and 
refinements.  By looking at the evolution of witnesses in the legal system 
as a whole, and not primarily through texts, it is possible to see how the 
law is “more practical than logical.”48  In particular, the sometimes 
traumatic encounters between cultures (such as Norman and Anglo-
Saxon or Roman Catholic and Celtic-Christian) produced social 
 
43.  William E. Forbath, Hendrik Hartog & Martha Minow, Introduction: Legal 
Histories from Below, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 759, 761–62 (noting the dominant view, which 
presumes that “the object of legal historical study is a known and distinctive body of texts” 
and that these texts, within the hands of a select group, constitute “the law”). 
44.  Id. at 761. 
45.  Id. at 764–65.  The authors question the dominant conception of “the law” as 
constituted in discrete texts.  Id.  They urge examination of the search for meaning, how 
issues were debated, and what rules of discourse were or were not abided by.  Id. 
46.  Id. at 765 (“To us law is not the formal banner, but its travels in the crowds grasping 
for it; not a singular voice, but the cacophony of many voices, including those usually 
unheard.”). 
47.  JOHN MAXCY ZANE, THE STORY OF LAW 43 (2d ed. 1998).  
48.  Id. at 260.  
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compromises and legal amalgams that help explain the current state of 
oral testimony.49  
Anglo-Saxon England in the several centuries prior to the Norman 
invasion was steeped in feudalism.50  Life was simple and brutal for 
many people.51  Small towns in rural communities predominated, and 
English life was characterized by limited literacy, limited travel, and 
limited life span.52  The countryside was subject to harsh weather 
conditions, disease and epidemic, and high infant mortality.53  These 
conditions gave rise to a “profoundly supernatural understanding of the 
world.”54  The credibility of reports about abnormal and inexplicable 
events, from a listener’s point of view, “depended [upon] . . . the 
authority of those who reported them.”55  Tellers took pains to establish 
the reliability of their sources rather than rely on other principles of 
logic, and the most reliable of sources were of supernatural or divine 
origin.56  Assertions that an angel appeared or that demons possessed 
someone carried as much weight as explanations based on global 
warming or post-traumatic stress might in today’s world.  
The Catholic Church operated as a governing body for the majority 
population, and Church policy of the time dictated that the 
commemoration of Jesus was the primary focus of the Church.57  In their 
daily lives, however, most people probably gave little thought to the 
complexities of Church regulation or the theoretical justifications for the 
dogma and rules that flowed from Rome.  Illiteracy bred reliance on 
authority, which ordinarily meant God and God’s “chosen” agents, such 
as bishops and kings.58 
If a high-level agent was not readily available, people looked 
elsewhere for confirmation.  At the popular level, a pervasive belief in 
 
49.  See 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 203 (1926) (observing 
that English law was influenced by canon law and “primitive ideas”); see also Forbath et al., 
supra note 43, at 761 (reflecting on the “[v]arious inputs—social, cultural, economic, 
political—[that] produce outputs, or legal texts,” which form the common law).   
50.  ZANE, supra note 47, at 211. 
51.  OLDRIDGE, supra note 13, at 5. 
52.  See id. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Id. at 6. 
55.  Id. at 7; see also MICHAEL MCKEON, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH NOVEL 1600–
1740, at 21 (1987) (noting medieval “dependence on received authorities”). 
56.  OLDRIDGE, supra note 13, at 7. 
57.  ZANE, supra note 47, at 211. 
58.  OLDRIDGE, supra note 13, at 6; ZANE, supra note 47, at 211–12. 
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the invisible world of demons, angels, and ghosts, and in their 
intervention, helped explain the world.59  Thus, when formal 
Catholicism met the baffling events of every-day existence, the 
intersection gave rise to a cult of saints.60  Although an erudite vision 
dominated in the upper echelons of the Church, that vision remained in 
contradistinction to the nonlinear mysticism applied by ordinary people 
to the practical needs of daily existence. 
The climate of dependency on the supernatural helps explain 
medieval society’s respect for authoritative texts, chief of which was the 
Bible.61  The revelations contained in Hebrew scriptures might be 
conceived of as someone (i.e., God) speaking through the prophets.62  
The writer of the sacred texts is the second author, or the medium, 
chosen by the unseen God to reveal some of what He, that same God, 
previously concealed.  What has been concealed is ultimate truth, and 
faith consists of accepting as truth the words as spoken or written by the 
medium.  
This world view sheds light on the respect for oaths, which were a 
widely utilized method for resolving disputes during this time.63  In the 
absence of empirical proof, it was natural to call on God as the great 
authority.  It is a relatively small (although highly significant) step from 
accepting as truth that which is sent by God through a spokesperson, as 
in scripture, to initiating a dialogue with God proactively and accepting 
as truth words spoken pursuant to an oath.  A perceived familiarity with 
unseen agents such as saints and demons may have helped this process 
along.64  Hence there is a strong connection between the idea of oath 
taking in the medieval legal world and the prophetic notion of scripture 
as the word of God. 
 
59.  OLDRIDGE, supra note 13, at 6. 
60.  JACQUES LE GOFF, HISTORY AND MEMORY 71 (Steven Rendall & Elizabeth 
Claman trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1992) (1977). 
61.  MCKEON, supra note 55, at 73–76. 
62.  PAUL RICOEUR, Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation (David Pellauer 
trans., 1976) [hereinafter RICOEUR, Hermeneutic of Revelation], in ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 29, at 73, 75–76. 
63.  See Laurie C. Kadoch, So Help Me God: Reflections on Language, Thought, and the 
Rules of Evidence Remembered, RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION, Fall 2007, at 1, 8 (tracing the 
linguistic development of trials from the Anglo-Saxon period when “God’s voice provided the 
absolute truth”). 
64.  The significance of oaths can be traced to the word’s etymology: an oath involves 
“going to fulfill a promise”; it implies faithfulness, constancy and, therefore, truth.  
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 1011. 
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When, in 1066, the Normans invaded the isle of Britain, a major 
transformation in English life began.  Times were still difficult; the years 
between the invasion and the ascendance of the Stuart and Tudor 
dynasties were fraught with plagues that restricted social intercourse, 
isolated communities, and contributed to communication breakdowns 
and social unrest.65  At the same time, however, Europe was 
experiencing a “literacy revolution” and an “acceleration of the 
empirical and historicizing impulse.”66  The Magna Carta made its 
appearance in 1215, a day was divided into twenty-four equal parts in 
1330,67 Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales were composed just before the turn 
of the fifteenth century,68 and Copernicus’s theory of the universe 
revolutionized scientific thought in the middle of the sixteenth century.69   
For a long time, elitist Church governance coexisted with popular 
custom.  But a changing Europe brought into relief the differences 
between the intellectualized, prescriptive orthodoxy of Church rule and 
the occultish, numinous beliefs and practices that typified ordinary life.  
The Middle Ages ushered in Gutenberg’s Bible and increased literacy, 
commercial exchange, world travels and the rising middle class, the 
seeds of scientific discovery and rationalism, and centralized 
government.  These changes took away some of the fear and uncertainty 
that had fed the supernatural mystique, as what was previously invisible 
became known.70 
 
65.  The first Justices of the Peace, whose job it was to maintain order, were not 
appointed by the Crown until the time of Edward III in the thirteenth century.  George 
Spence, The History of the Court of Chancery, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LEGAL HISTORY 219, 240–41 (Comm. of the Ass’n of Am. Law Schs. ed., 1908) [hereinafter 
2 SELECT ESSAYS].  Prior to that time, law enforcement was strictly a local affair, 
accomplished through mutual pledges.  Id.  Even with the imposition of criminal sanctions for 
breaches of the peace during the reign of Richard II (1377–1399), there was no real 
enforcement of laws promoting public order.  Id.  Special commissions to look into the status 
of the poor under Henry III’s reign (1216–1272) did little to alleviate the disorderly 
conditions that prevailed.  Id. 
66.  MCKEON, supra note 55, at 35. 
67.  DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE DISCOVERERS 39 (1st Vintage Books ed. 1985). 
68.  Id. at 521–23.  William Caxton (1422–1491), publisher of The Canterbury Tales, has 
been called the “midwife of a flourishing English literature.”  Id.  An English translation of 
the Bible, named for King James I (1566–1625), was published shortly thereafter.  Id. at 523–
24.  The first folios of William Shakespeare’s plays were also compiled during the reign of 
James I.  See id. at 521, 549. 
69.  Id. at 22. 
70.  See Brian Manning, The Levellers and Religion, in RADICAL RELIGION IN THE 
ENGLISH REVOLUTION 65, 67–68 (J.F. McGregor & B. Reay eds., 1984). 
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As these events were unfolding, the Normans’ presence was being 
felt in England.  All social and governmental institutions felt the force of 
cultures colliding.  The impact of these changes was of course 
tremendous.  In the religious milieu, progress meant decreasing reliance 
on authority, with those in authority struggling to maintain their place in 
the hierarchy.71  The situation was ripe for conflict, and as governments 
became more centralized, and military forces with them, the Church 
found itself in a competition for dominance.  Assaults on the Church 
were instigated in political circles, but opponents and critics took aim at 
the Church’s ideological and intellectual foundations as well.72   
Thus began a transition from a society that was highly dependent on 
unseen powers to one characterized to a much greater extent by claims 
to knowledge, demands for proof, and assertions of participatory rights.  
The changes had profound and lasting effects on witnessing in legal 
forums.  
In the Anglo-Saxon period, there were no witnesses of the modern 
type, who would provide factual information to aid in decision making.73  
Testimony was rarely produced in court for any purpose.74  For the most 
part, disputes were settled by appeals to God, some of which were direct 
and some of which were made through intermediaries.75  To the extent 
that people were called to court, they appeared not for the purpose of 
convincing a human judge to make or accept factual deductions, but 
simply to call on God as a witness to the truth.76  These individuals were 
not, in current terminology, witnesses, but “oath-helpers.”77  They swore 
to a belief in a party’s claim but not to any fact.78  The probative force of 
 
71.  See id. at 65 (describing the Levellers’ belief that common people could discover the 
meaning of religious texts); see also Susan Mosher Stuard, Women’s Witnessing: A New 
Departure, in WITNESSES FOR CHANGE: QUAKER WOMEN OVER THREE CENTURIES 3, 9–10 
(Elisabeth Potts Brown & Susan Mosher Stuard eds., 1989) (discussing Quakers’ rejection of 
privilege and a belief in individual worth). 
72.  See Manning, supra note 70, at 67. 
73.  HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49 , at 177–78. 
74.  Id. at 177. 
75.  Or by fighting.  If the defendant insisted on an opportunity to make his case, there 
would be nothing left to do but fight it out.  James Bradley Thayer, The Older Modes of Trial, 
in 2 SELECT ESSAYS, supra note 65, at 367, 376, 383. 
76.  M.M. KNAPPEN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 61 (1942). 
77.  Id. 
78.  ZANE, supra note 47, at 215–16. 
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oral testimony thus came not from the logic of its content but from the 
act of taking an oath.79 
Procedurally, a formal dispute was initiated by a foreoath, a sworn 
statement by the plaintiff asserting a wrong and the truth of his claim.80  
Thus, for example, the plaintiff would aver that a neighbor stole his cow 
or that he was owed money for rent.  He would then produce a secta 
(literally, a “suit”), which was a group of friends or allies organized to 
“prove” or establish that the case was serious, genuine, and not 
frivolous.81  A summons would be issued and the defendant would be 
expected to counter with a sworn denial.82  
All oral pleading was done in accordance with strict formalities and 
set forms.83  Precise verbal accuracy was demanded.84  This substantiated 
the “truth” of the party’s assertions.  If there was the slightest hesitation 
or stuttering, the party’s cause could be lost.85  A contemporary maxim 
captured the stringency of the formula: “He who fail[s] in a syllable 
fail[s] in everything.”86  The practice, which seems unnecessarily rigid to 
modern sensibilities, illustrates the reliance on invisible powers 
prevalent in the Middle Ages; God, according to this perspective, would 
ensure that the honest person spoke clearly and precisely. 
Because certainty is attained in such a world view not by analyzing 
the substance of a claim or witness credibility but by an appeal to divine 
authority, added value could reasonably be assumed to follow from 
increasing the number of oaths.87  Thus, the natural progression of 
 
79.  Moreover, “[t]hat probative force was attached, not so much to the matter to which 
[the witnesses] . . . testified under the sanction of an oath, as to the act of swearing to the truth 
of a fact under the prescribed forms.”  HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49, at 204; see also JAMES 
AUSTIN HUGHES, WITNESSES IN CRIMINAL TRIALS OF CLERICS: AN HISTORICAL SYNOPSIS 
AND COMMENTARY 11 (1937). 
80.  KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 59; ZANE, supra note 47, at 214–15.  In many cases, the 
plaintiff was also required to give sureties.  KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 59.  In criminal cases, 
as a general matter, formal charges would be brought and the complainant introduced 
“evidence.”  See HUGHES, supra note 79, at 7.  The person accused was required to answer.  
See id. 
81.  KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 59; ZANE, supra note 47, at 214–15. 
82.  KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 59; ZANE, supra note 47, at 215.  According to a then-
surviving Germanic custom, “In the early days a man’s relatives were required to produce 
him in court when required.”  KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 58.  
83.  KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 59. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49, at 204. 
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advocacy was toward establishing a kind of numerical superiority.  From 
Roman law, incorporated into Anglo-Saxon law, had come the idea that 
two witnesses were needed for proof.88  Hence, if a plaintiff produced 
two swearers, the defendant would need to produce four; if the plaintiff 
had six, the defendant had to have twelve.89  Trial by witnesses, 
therefore, soon evolved into a system known as “wager of law.”90  In this 
scheme, the value of witnesses—who were not fact-reporters in the first 
instance—came to be measured in quantitative, much more than 
qualitative, terms.91  Given such circumstances, it was only a matter of 
time before the buying and selling of oaths became lucrative business 
practice.92 
Following the Norman Invasion of 1066, a transition to external 
proof began, eventually investing witnesses with a narrative role.  
Perhaps the most significant custom introduced by the Normans leading 
to this outcome was the jury.93  In the Norman system, community 
members might be called on to aid the court in its deliberations.94  
Skepticism about the efficacy of ordeals and doubts about the reliability 
of God as a judge of legal affairs contributed to the eventual adoption of 
 
88.  Id. at 203–04, 208.  It had first become a rule of canonical law, having precedent in 
both the Old and the New Testaments.  Id. at 203. 
89.  James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development (pt. 1), 5 HARV. L. REV. 249, 261 
(1892). 
90.  ZANE, supra note 47, at 216. 
91.  HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49, at 204.  
92.  A separate class of “witness” existed primarily in criminal cases.  In such matters, it 
was believed that the defendant could not be punished on the “mere testimony” of humans; 
he or she was entitled to submit to an ordeal, that is, to be tested directly before God as the 
ultimate witness.  KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 61; see also HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49, at 
178–79; ZANE, supra note 47, at 216.  Following the Norman invasion, trial by battle was also 
employed.  KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 195.  A popular method of dispute resolution in the 
time of John I (1166–1216), it was in most respects a reversion to blood feuds of earlier times.  
Id.  This practice was an extension of the general assumption “that divine will and 
righteousness are immanent in human affairs.”  MCKEON, supra note 55, at 35.  The idea was 
that the accused could appeal to God to establish innocence by, for example, successfully 
sticking his hand in boiling oil to retrieve a smooth stone, Hubert Hall, The Methods of the 
Royal Courts of Justice in the Fifteenth Century, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS, supra note 65, at 418, 
428, or by submerging himself the length of several yards, without floating upward, in cold, 
still waters consecrated for the purpose by a priest, KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 62.  Hall 
reports that “in the old days of simple piety and austere faith before the Conquest, the ordeal 
was always performed as a solemn religious mystery,” with divine intersession sought through 
“prayer and fasting.”  Hall, supra, at 428.  Over time, the rite “degenerated into a meaningless 
form of law.”  Id.  
93.  ZANE, supra note 47, at 422. 
94.  Id.; see also KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 195–96. 
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this practice in England so that, by the time of Henry II (1133–1189), 
the Saxon custom of compurgation or wager of law had combined with 
the Norman tradition of using the jury as a fact-finding body.95  The 
English began to allow parties to gather their oath-helper groups 
together into witness-juries.96  
Jurors in this transitional time were witnesses in the sense that they 
produced the evidence or proofs relied upon, but they were also much 
more.  The jury was considered a “test to which the parties had 
consented”; it “represented the voice of the country-side.”97  Eventually, 
in England, these groups engaged in decision making, relying heavily on 
pleadings but not limited to any particular type of information.98  
Verdicts were rendered on the basis of the jurors’ “own conscious 
persuasion of the facts, and not merely by supervising external tests.”99 
Despite the Normans’ political (as well as military) dominance,100 
changes in the English legal system developed more through 
compromise and local accommodation than through royal fiat or any 
legislative imposition.  The process changed gradually, with significant 
concessions to Anglo-Saxon tradition.  The modern witness is thus not 
so much a product of design as an accidental blend of cultures.  In the 
end, although the secta of Anglo-Saxon times evolved into proof 
witnesses,101 it was not before significant “reforms” made long-lasting 
impressions on the system. 
A window of opportunity existed in this period for the development 
of narrative witnessing, fortified by the solemnity of the oath, but 
progress was hampered by circumstances.  The purchase and sale of 
oaths had become a profitable business, and perjury was rampant.102  
 
95.  KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 195.  
96.  Id. at 61. 
97.  HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49, at 181. 
98.  KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 195–96. 
99.  John Henry Wigmore, A General Survey of the History of the Rules of Evidence, in 2 
SELECT ESSAYS, supra note 65, at 691, 692.  Their decision-making responsibility meant they 
could not be separately examined, however; rather, they were asked only to render a verdict.  
It was not considered the business of the courts to ascertain how the verdict was reached.  
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49, at 181. 
100.  Heinrich Brunner, The Sources of English Law, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS, supra note 
65, at 7, 20–21; see also ZANE, supra note 47, at 422 (“At last had come the Normans, then the 
leading race in Europe, and they came not to ruin but to save . . . .”). 
101.  Thayer, supra note 75, at 377. 
102.  ZANE, supra note 47, at 253 (“The spectacle of wager of law had confirmed every 
lawyer in the opinion that the witnesses a litigant produces are produced because they are 
ready to commit perjury.”). 
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Although with the ingress of the Normans, the community witnesses 
system, which relied on fact-oriented testimony and not on sworn oaths, 
soon replaced wager of law even in the local courts, this system was 
“almost as great a stupidity as wager of law.”103  It meant only that 
instead of purchasing oaths outright, unscrupulous litigants would bribe 
the community witnesses.104  These attempts to influence the jury led to 
maintenance laws.105  
Because oath-takers were so easily bought, the law permitted parties 
to sue for “maintaining” false suits.106  The common law courts granted 
damages for successful maintenance suits.107  Unfortunately, heavy fines 
imposed on juries who were found to have made wrong decisions filled 
the King’s coffers108 but did little to encourage participation in the 
judicial truth-finding process.   
Maintenance, it turned out, was the reform that kept honest 
witnesses away.  The threat of suit was supposed to—but did not—
discourage false oaths.109  As a consequence, the liars continued to be 
bought; but honest people were afraid to be witnesses, and they could 
not be compelled to be.110  Despite evidence of widespread disregard for 
the gravity of an oath, swearing was deemed such a serious matter that 
law and policy makers were reluctant to put people’s souls in jeopardy 
by forcing them to take oaths.111  Expansion of witness narrative was 
thereby curtailed. 
A major turning point in legal procedure came with the passage of 
the Statute of 1562–1563, granting courts the power to compel witnesses 
 
103.  Id. at 254. 
104.  HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49, at 182. 
105.  See Thayer, supra note 89, at 261. 
106.  ZANE, supra note 47, at 253–54. 
107.  Spence, supra note 65, at 244. 
108.  ZANE, supra note 47, at 258. 
109.  Id. at 253–54. 
110.  Id. at 254, 258. 
111.  Id. at 259.  There were those who agitated for reform.  Among them was Henry de 
Bracton, best known as the original compiler of cases from the Anglo-Saxon period.  Id. at 
238.  His efforts to bring into the courts the practice of witness examination failed, however.  
In England, the eclectic jury, rather than canonical procedure, assumed the place of earlier 
modes of proof.  HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49, at 181.  The Catholic Church’s abuse of the 
oath in the thirteenth century is cited by Andrew Bentz as the impetus for the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  Andrew J.M. Bentz, Note, The Original Public Meaning of the 
Fifth Amendment and Pre-Miranda Silence, 98 VA. L. REV. 897, 900, 909–10 (2012). 
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to testify.112  In addition, a new rule governing probes into attainted jury 
allegations prohibited an appellate body’s reliance on any evidence not 
before the allegedly offending jury.113  These changes in procedure 
spelled the demise of maintenance suits, but they arrived too late to 
encourage witness narration.114  By the time the Tudors came to power, 
the jury—in its hybrid form—already was the almost exclusive method 
of decision; once the fear of suits for maintenance was lifted in the mid-
sixteenth century, it was only a matter of time before the jury divested 
itself of its witness role and became solely the trier of facts.115   
From the seventeenth century on, verdicts were based not on the 
jurors’ own knowledge but on evidence produced in court.116  This 
change made the appearance of witnesses necessary and had a profound 
effect on the laws of evidence and pleading.117  The division of witness 
and juror roles soon gave rise to laws regulating evidence.118  Indeed, 
once the jury’s role changed, and oral testimony became the norm, the 
need for limits on testimony became apparent.119  Unless court 
proceedings were to be interminable, some regulation on time and 
admissibility was inevitable.  The primary purposes behind the earliest 
evidentiary rules were to ensure that courts kept to the issues and to 
prevent them from being misled.120  Thus it was that evidence law 
started with rules of exclusion.  
In devising rules of exclusion, the courts were concerned first not 
with relevance, however, but with the competency of witnesses.121  This 
is not surprising given the history of testimony and its reliance on 
“primitive idea[s]” about the intrinsic value of the oath.122  The 
widespread abuse of the sacred oath galvanized a campaign to restrict its 
 
112.  HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49, at 185; KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 406.  This 
change was initiated and first enforced on behalf of the Crown and soon was utilized in all but 
criminal cases.  Wigmore, supra note 99, at 693. 
113.  ZANE, supra note 47, at 259.  
114.  See id. 
115.  KNAPPEN, supra note 76, at 406; ZANE, supra note 47, at 259–60. 
116.  Wigmore, supra note 99, at 692. 
117.  HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49, at 126.  
118.  Id. at 207; ZANE, supra note 47, at 423. 
119.  ZANE, supra note 47, at 423. 
120.  See Wigmore, supra note 99, at 693. 
121.  Id. 
122.  See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49, at 204–05 (discussing inferences drawn from 
biblical foundations of oath taking and suggesting they were illogical). 
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use; the pendulum swing from the vilified wager of law was to laws of 
evidence permitting only “worthy” persons to take the oath.123 
This foreshortened court proceedings but had the added effect of 
excluding whole classes of people from the decision-making process.  
Once it was determined who was trustworthy, and therefore legally 
competent to swear, rules establishing a privilege not to testify were 
devised.124  In time, rules permitting cross examination, prohibiting 
hearsay, and establishing other relevancy limits on evidence were 
adopted.125  These early evidentiary issues have shaped court 
proceedings ever since. 
Additionally, starting in about the sixteenth century, the trial 
became a forum not for spokespersons of all-knowing beings but for 
custodians of the past; witnesses became chroniclers, not oracles.126  
History had come into its own as a discipline in the decades linking 
medieval to modern life, and it—not literature—provided the paradigm 
for legal narrative.  At its earliest developmental stages in western 
civilization,127 the discipline of history was concerned with 
“investigations” and “testimonies,”128 founded on the principle of 
truth.129  An essential determinant of historical structure is the location 
of data in a narrative sequence; writing history involves “rearrangement 
of the past,” subject to the influences of “social, ideological, and political 
structures.”130  History, again, as opposed to narrative, has always been 
affiliated with documentation.131  Writing provided the means for storing 
information and for committing knowledge to memory.  Documentation 
also permitted examination of information over time.132  These 
 
123.  See Wigmore, supra note 99, at 693–94. 
124.  HOLDSWORTH, supra note 49, at 127; Wigmore, supra note 99, at 693. 
125.  Wigmore, supra note 99, at 693. 
126.  See Richard J. Ross, The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers: 
Memory as Keyword, Shelter, and Identity, 1560–1640, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229 (1998). 
127.  See generally LE GOFF, supra note 60, at 185. 
128.  Id. at xvi. 
129.  Id. at 185.  History, Le Goff says, “takes truth as its norm.”  Id. at 114.  Cicero, he 
notes, for example, calls history “the light of truth.”  Id. at 187 (quoting 2 MARCUS TULLIUS 
CICERO, DE ORATORE *36). 
130.  Id. at xi. 
131.  Early on, historians subscribed to the notion that history should be “sought 
everywhere,” in the daily lives, work, and leisure of the people.  Id. at 162.  The intent of early 
publications was to illuminate what was real by detecting and recording everything that 
happened.  Id. 
132.  Id. at 59–60. 
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characteristics of history as a discipline suited the courtroom culture that 
was developing around evidence law. 
As the divide between known and unknown grew in significance, 
trial lawyers, like historians, aligned themselves with those on the side of 
empiricism.133  By the late eighteenth century, the dominant narrative in 
law—as in science, history, and even literature and Christian religions—
was one of “carefully managed circumstantial evidence.”134  Even when 
direct testimony was available, the “narrative arranged from 
circumstantial evidence [was] . . . the most favored proof of all.”135  
Retrospectively, this evolution of the Anglo-American trial has been 
viewed as an attempt to lead fact finders, through the use of evidentiary 
rules, to judgments based in reason, unclouded by emotion.136  
In early English history, to the extent that witnesses had any 
involvement in legal proceedings, their impact had derived from the 
power of the oath, which was an appeal to an essentialized authority.  
Even with increased reliance on external proof in post-medieval Britain, 
and a decline in the significance of the oath, however, the role of 
narration was not entrusted to courtroom witnesses.  The textual law 
grew, but the social foundations were de-emphasized.  In the end, the 
judicial system both prescribed the witness’s narrative framework and 
deprived the parties—and society as a whole—of the gravity of the 
oath-taking act. 
IV. LITERARY LENS 
The idea of “witness” in literature has followed a very different 
course from that in the legal realm.  The need for witnessing, from the 
literary narrator’s perspective, stems from loss of story.  Loss of story 
may be occasioned by, among other things, oppression, subordination, 
or trauma, and may occur at the individual level or at a broader 
community level.  The loss may be of past stories, current events, or 
future stories.  Essentially, literary witnesses feel compelled to recite 
narratives that have not been heard, either because a version of the 
story has been denied by listeners or because there has been an absence 
 
133.  See Ross, supra note 126, at 230. 
134.  ALEXANDER WELSH, STRONG REPRESENTATIONS: NARRATIVE AND 
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN ENGLAND, at ix (1992). 
135.  Id. at x. 
136.  Kadoch, supra note 63, at 8. 
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of an “addressable other” to hear the story.137  Literary witnesses seek to 
recover lost stories; stand up to the silencers and subordinators; counter 
hegemonic stories; correct the record through collaborative action; and 
expose or shape cultural and historical truths.  The circumstances 
occasioning the need for witness are variable: original witnesses may die 
or otherwise be unavailable, or stories may be incomplete.  In some 
instances, the literary narrator becomes a conduit for a story that could 
not even be witnessed in the first instance.138  
In the literary field, some writers have made specific claims to a 
witness role.139  The idea that narrative is a means of denying the 
subjectivity imposed by dominant discourse has been explored in 
multiple contexts, including those in relation to post-neocolonialism,140 
the Holocaust,141 and the African slave experience.142  A powerful 
personal need for release from silence is similarly well documented.143  
In the case of trauma, for example, the actual experience may be 
blocked or delayed,144 preventing production of a contemporaneous 
narrative.145  The victim is silenced, but not by the direct imposition of 
 
137.  See DORI LAUB, Bearing Witness, or the Vicissitudes of Listening [hereinafter 
LAUB, Bearing Witness], in TESTIMONY, supra note 33, at 57, 68 (emphasis omitted) (noting 
the gravity of this situation for trauma victims); Yxta Maya Murray, Rape Trauma, the State, 
and the Art of Tracey Emin, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1631 (2012) (exploring victim’s artistic 
response to trial proceedings that did not authentically represent her story). 
138.  In such cases, the lack of known particulars does not obviate the need for telling 
because, from the literary witness’s point of view, it is the connectivity—or the journey—
between the past and the future that matters.  See, e.g., SERGIO PARUSSA, WRITING AS 
FREEDOM, WRITING AS TESTIMONY: FOUR ITALIAN WRITERS AND JUDAISM 26–28 (2008) 
(developing the idea that such story remnants have value). 
139.  See, e.g., TESTIMONY, supra note 33 (discussing the novels of Albert Camus); 
SHOSHANA FELMAN, Camus’ The Plague, or a Monument to Witnessing [hereinafter 
FELMAN, Camus’ The Plague], in TESTIMONY, supra note 33, at 93, 116 (discussing the 
writings of Elie Wiesel); Signorini, supra note 37, at 183 (discussing the work of Primo Levi). 
140.  E.g., CRAFT, supra note 28, at 6-7, 15–17.  
141.  E.g., Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The Holocaust as Historical Record, in DIMENSIONS OF 
THE HOLOCAUST: LECTURES AT NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY  21, 24–27 (1977) 
[hereinafter DIMENSIONS OF THE HOLOCAUST] (annotated by Elliot Lefkovitz). 
142.  E.g., ROSETTA E. ROSS, WITNESSING AND TESTIFYING: BLACK WOMEN, 
RELIGION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 14 (2003).  By way of example, Ross subsequently relates how 
civil rights activists brought into focus a norm of relationship that challenged the primacy of 
individual rights.  Id. at 223–25. 
143.  Signorini, supra note 37, at 177; Elie Wiesel, The Holocaust as Literary Inspiration, 
in DIMENSIONS OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 141, at 5, 10. 
144.  LAUB, Bearing Witness, supra note 137, at 57. 
145.  CASSIE PREMO STEELE, WE HEAL FROM MEMORY: SEXTON, LORDE, 
ANZALDÚA, AND THE POETRY OF WITNESS 3 (2000). 
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another’s power; rather, the individual’s psyche closes the paths to 
perception.  Breaking self-imposed silence or breaking through 
externally imposed barriers to speech often calls into service narrative 
methods involving a coach or literary ally.  Along these lines, E.L. 
Doctorow asserts that modern psychology is, in essence, the 
“industrialization of storytelling.”146  People who experience psychic or 
emotional distress meet with professionals who listen and encourage 
patients to talk out their pain.  Trauma victims—and their therapists, 
coaches, or allies along with them—go through a process of narrative 
recovery, both in the sense of acquiring lost history and in the sense of 
restoring health.147 
Literary witnesses recognize that storytelling is not a solitary activity.  
It requires a listener or a reader; a narrative involves a telling to.  Even 
in the most difficult of situations, where oral or written narration is 
blocked, stories are told to someone, although that someone may be 
imagined or dreamed.148  Moreover, such reclamation of story and 
identity is needed at both the individual level149 and at the group level.150  
Significantly, it is also deemed required by future generations.151  More 
than just personal identity insurance,152 recovered stories often serve as 
a testimonial bridge between those living in the present and those who 
follow or survive.153  This is sometimes consciously experienced as a 
compulsion to tell.154 
 
146.  E.L. Doctorow, False Documents, AM. REV., Nov. 1977, at 215, as reprinted in E.L. 
DOCTOROW: ESSAYS AND CONVERSATIONS 16, 26 (Richard Trenner ed., 1983). 
147.  SUZETTE A. HENKE, SHATTERED SUBJECTS: TRAUMA AND TESTIMONY IN 
WOMEN’S LIFE-WRITING, at xxii (1998). 
148.  See Signorini, supra note 37, at 178, 193.  One example Signorini gives is of 
concentration camp internees reporting dreams in which the dreamer would be recounting his 
or her experiences to someone at home.  Id. at 178. 
149.  CRAFT, supra note 28, at 4. 
150.  Signorini, supra note 37, at 186 (noting that “identity is shaped by . . . [our] 
memory of . . . [the] past”). 
151.  Thus, in occupied Poland, Emmanuel Ringelbaum encouraged ghettoized Jews to 
record the details of their existence by keeping diaries.  Dawidowicz, supra note 141, at 24–25.  
“I regard it as a sacred task,” one worker wrote, adding that the time would come when the 
world would know.  Id. at 25.  It was for this reason, also, that the Sonderkommandos of 
Auschwitz, whose lot it was to remove the bodies of the murdered from gas chambers, 
surreptitiously recorded their stories.  Id. at 27. 
152.  Signorini, supra note 37, at 186. 
153.  Austin Sarat, Bearing Witness and Writing History in the Struggle Against Capital 
Punishment, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 451, 454 (1996). 
154.  As Elie Wiesel has said of his own writing, “The urge to bear witness was 
overwhelming.”  Wiesel, supra note 143, at 11; see also ROSS, supra note 142, at 223 (witness 
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When the goal is recovery, the process may be one of re-
enactment—or, more accurately, an original experiencing—of 
traumatizing events.155  But recovery can take place at the social as well 
as at a personal level, with the historical accounting at stake,156 or to 
ensure that the narrative sets the record straight so that people do not 
suffer or die in vain.157  The narration of experience can, in an 
essentialized way, constitute an “ethic of recollection” such that, for 
victims, “[s]urvival and bearing witness become reciprocal acts.”158 
Alternatively to or coincidentally with story, recovery may be the 
production of a counterstory, in which the witness is saying, “this is what 
really happened.”  Counterstories are common responses to oppression; 
told one person at a time, they are often heroic in content.  The 
counterstory may be unique and deeply personal, but in such a 
narrative, often the personal becomes representational.159  The impetus 
for the counterstory can be a desire to raise awareness,160 to correct 
injustices, or simply to register protest.161  Speech may be seen as a 
 
narration comes from the need a person “has to tell somebody” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
155.  See FELMAN, Camus’ The Plague, supra note 139, at 117–18. 
156.  For example, Lucy Dawidowicz writes that participants in Oneg Shabbat, an effort 
to create and preserve records of the Warsaw ghetto, saw themselves as “creating a chapter of 
history.”  Dawidowicz, supra note 141, at 24–26.  Dawidowicz quotes from a document 
produced at the behest of historian Emmanuel Ringelbaum, who importuned the writing of 
diaries in the Polish ghetto during the German occupation and explicitly urged efforts at 
historical preservation in the face of imposed silence.  Id.  “What we could not cry out to the 
world,” the archivist said, “we buried in the ground.”  Id.  In a similar vein, Anne Rice, in an 
anthology of anti-lynching works, notes the determination to counteract the “staggering . . . 
amnesia” about racial violence.  Rice, supra note 39, at 2. 
157.  Lacey Baldwin Smith, Forward to DIMENSIONS OF THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 
141, at 1, 1.  Through their testimony, witnesses can insist that the world remember.  See 
Sarat, supra note 153, at 462. 
158.  FELMAN, Camus’ The Plague, supra note 139, at 117 (quoting TERRENCE DES 
PRES, THE SURVIVOR: AN ANATOMY OF LIFE IN THE DEATH CAMPS 31 (1976)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
159.  Holocaust writer Dorothy Rabinowitz explores this idea, reflecting on how many 
survivors understand that they inhabit two worlds: one the real world of the traumatizing 
experience and one the “absurd” world outside the traumatic place, populated by those who 
don’t share the experience.  When the two worlds collide, the call of truth can overcome the 
safety of silence.  Dorothy Rabinowitz, The Holocaust as Living Memory, in DIMENSIONS OF 
THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 141, at 35, 37. 
160.  E.g., Rice, supra note 39, at 3. 
161.  E.g., CRAFT, supra note 28, at 15; Rice, supra note 39, at 23; Wiesel, supra note 
143, at 8. 
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political act.162  Witnesses deliberately seek to use discourse as a tool; 
they look at how discourse works, not just what it means.163  Testimony 
provided in this way may be intentionally subversive and even 
marginal.164  
At times, more than the urge to create an accurate account is at 
work.  There being a recognition that history inevitably will be rewritten 
and sculpted, witnesses may have an ambitious agenda: to shape the 
future, in effect, writing or rewriting history.165  Shoshana Felman and 
Dori Laub, analyzing the literary, post-traumatic representation of 
history, discuss Albert Camus’ work in this way, elucidating his hope of 
transforming society through testimony.166  Fiction writer Russell Banks 
reveals a similar intention to expose the hidden consequences of law and 
social policy in the context of juvenile sex offender legislation.167 
Whether writing fiction or nonfiction, and whether addressing a 
contemporary audience or a future audience, what literary witnesses 
believe to be at stake is nothing less than truth.168  Even a commitment 
to truth, of course, assures neither accuracy nor honesty.  The problems 
of loss of story and concomitant loss of truth are not readily solved by 
deliberate efforts to recover lost stories, oppose silencers and 
oppressors, publish counterstories, and correct or manipulate the 
historical record, even when those efforts are accompanied by a sincere 
commitment to honesty or truth telling.  For a literary narrator, whether 
first-hand or secondary witness, such a commitment often raises the 
 
162.  CRAFT, supra note 28, at 3 (discussing the work of Nobel Prize recipient Rigoberta 
Menchú). 
163.  Id. at 7.  Franca Signorini, for example, says that the writers of the Holocaust not 
only want to affirm their factual reality but desire that their work serve as an admonition.  
Signorini, supra note 37, at 179.  
164.  CRAFT, supra note 28, at 22. 
165.  Id. at 7. 
166.  FELMAN, Camus’ The Plague, supra note 139, at 95. 
167.  Patrick Anderson, Book Review, WASH. LAW., Jan. 2012, at 40 (reviewing 
RUSSELL BANKS, LOST MEMORY OF SKIN (2011)),  available  at  http://www.dcbar.org/bar-re
sources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/january-2012-books-in-the-law.cfm, archived 
at http://perma.cc/KE72-JRZ4. 
168.  ARTHUR W. FRANK, THE WOUNDED STORYTELLER: BODY, ILLNESS, AND 
ETHICS 137, 139 (2d ed. 2013).  This is no less the case when silence has come about through 
trauma and operates as much as a sanctuary as it does a prison.  See LAUB, Bearing Witness, 
supra note 137, at 58.  It is symptomatic of trauma that blocked experiences—what the 
subconscious recognizes as truth—make repeated intrusions into consciousness against the 
conscious will.  HENKE, supra note 147, at xvii.  Holocaust survivor and writer Primo Levi, for 
example, described himself as “a bearer of secrets, from which he . . . [had to] be released in 
order to regain his humanity.”  Signorini, supra note 37, at 177. 
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question of “how to remain faithful to the truth of historical facts while 
going beyond the objective and detached language of history.”169  In 
fact, witnesses for whom memories are an integral part of a narrative are 
likely to experience a tension created between “the rights of imagination 
and the rights of history.”170  Accordingly, the roles, boundaries, and 
methods of narrative witnesses need to be carefully defined. 
The role of a witness is to testify, but the terms “witness” and 
“testify,” in noun, verb, or derivative form, are distinguishable.  
Testimony designates the act of “relating what one has seen or heard.”171  
“The witness is author of this action . . . .”172  Thus, “testimony is not 
perception itself but the report, . . . the story, the narration of the 
event.”173  Important distinctions also must be made between the 
primary witness or experiencer and the ultimate narrator, who may or 
may not be the primary witness.  The work of the witness can occur on 
multiple planes.  While the need for testimony invariably arises out of 
primary experience, the act of testifying may be assumed by someone 
other than the primary witness.174  These distinctions are of great 
significance to witnesses who see themselves as operating in the literary 
field.   
While the primary subject can certainly tell her own story,175 when 
the individual who had the experience being narrated is also the 
narrator, the witness has dual, and potentially conflicting, roles.  A 
writer can be split in two, into “creator and documentarian, teller and 
listener.”176  Most often, in the literary witnessing context, the witness is 
one who has seen another’s experience or who has heard the first-hand 
account of an experience from another.  This addresses, to some extent, 
any concern that, in a case of first-person reporting, the narrator may 
lack the detachment necessary for honest reporting. 
 
169.  PARUSSA, supra note 138, at 33. 
170.  Id. 
171.  RICOEUR, Hermeneutics of Testimony, supra note 29, at 123. 
172.  Id. (emphasis added). 
173.  Id. 
174.  Narration by a listener or observer may spring from the same impulse that 
motivates primary witnesses: the desire “to give meaning to suffering” or an urge to justify, or 
“prove,” claims to experiential meaning.  Signorini, supra note 37, at 177. 
175.  A full exploration of this question can be found in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 
Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Cary 
Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988).  
176.  Doctorow, supra note 146, at 21.  Although Doctorow is speaking of novelists, he 
professes in the essay to see no real distinction between fiction and nonfiction.  Id. at 24–25. 
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Moreover, the narration by one who is not a first-hand experiencer 
has some advantages.  The verification process may be facilitated by the 
presence and participation of a sympathetic agent or intermediary 
narrative co-producer, perhaps one educated in the art of discourse.177  
Telling and re-telling a story are means of universalizing the 
experience178 or of what Parussa describes as “putting the past, through 
an active act of memory, back into the flow of life.”179  Again, skill and 
experience can facilitate this function of witnessing.  Authenticity is 
further realized because the observer-witness or a listener-witness goes 
through the original experience in some way.  The primary experience 
may then be passed on by that person to a different audience, one that 
might not otherwise have been accessed.  
Audience is an important concept in literary witnessing.  Testimony 
is not monologue; it cannot take place in solitude.  It requires the 
“intimate and total presence of an other.”180  Testimony happens 
through communication, between “the one who testifies and the one 
who hears the testimony.”181  In this way, a relationship, however 
tenuous, is created.  Indeed, all authorship involves a relationship 
between narrator and listener,182 with the listener being a key player183 
who “comes to be a participant [in] and co-owner of” the story.184  And, 
as Paul Ricoeur notes, “[i]t is only by hearing” that one “can believe or 
not believe in the reality of” what a witness says.185  The participants in 
testimonial narration—the primary subject, who has experienced 
something, and the observer-narrator or listener-reteller—are in one 
relationship.186  Audience adds another dimension, and a different, new 
 
177.  CRAFT, supra note 28, at 19. 
178.  See Signorini, supra note 37, at 185. 
179.  PARUSSA, supra note 138, at 169. 
180.  LAUB, Bearing Witness, supra note 137, at 70–71. 
181.  RICOEUR, Hermeneutics of Testimony, supra note 29, at 123; Signorini, supra note 
37, at 177. 
182.  CRAFT, supra note 28, at 19–20. 
183.  SHOSHANA FELMAN & DORI LAUB, Forward to TESTIMONY, supra note 33, at 
xiii, xvi; STEELE, supra note 145, at 4.  Felman and Laub note that, in some situations where 
the trauma memory has been suppressed, even though there may be documentation and 
historical evidence, the trauma as a known event may not have been taken cognizance of and 
hence may not have been “witnessed.”  LAUB, Bearing Witness, supra note 137, at 57. 
184.  LAUB, Bearing Witness, supra note 137, at 57. 
185.  RICOEUR, Hermeneutics of Testimony, supra note 29, at 123.  
186.  CRAFT, supra note 28, at 19–20. 
 2015] THE CALL TO WITNESS 1613 
relationship is formed when the experience, translated into words, 
reaches that audience. 
Testimony as story, Ricoeur also explains, is “found in an 
intermediary position between a statement made by a person and a 
belief assumed by another on the faith of the testimony of the first.”187  
A relationship of trust, in other words, between narrator and audience, 
is essential to acceptance and preservation of the story.  Literary 
witnesses assume the responsibility for establishing this trust, and one 
challenging aspect of the literary witness’s position is always in 
mediating the relationship between the one who had the original 
experience and the ultimate listeners.  Gloria Anzaldúa describes the 
situation as one in which the witness exists in two worlds, in what she 
terms the “[b]orderlands.”188  As a writer attempting to reliably relate 
primary experience to another, Anzaldúa says she lives in a state of 
“psychic unrest,” engaged in “an endless cycle of making it worse, 
making it better, but always making meaning out of the experience, 
whatever it [might] be.”189  Ricoeur frames this idea as “dialectic 
moments of testimony” and identifies three types of testimonial 
narrative that develop from the relationship between primary 
witness/experiencer and literary narrator/witness.190  The interactivity 
may involve event and meaning (as in the case of trauma recovery), trial 
and false testimony (as in a counterstory to the dominant story), and 
historical archiving (as in a proactive production of historical record).191 
When not in the position of primary witness, a witness’s secondary 
experience can fall along a continuum from passive listening, to 
participation as ally, to vicarious experience.  In the simplest form of 
testimonial narrative, a story goes from an observer to publication.  A 
narrator in this depiction might be described as “an informed and an 
honest witness,” whose role is “only to say: this is what happened, when 
he knows that it actually did happen.”192  One step removed is the 
situation in which the literary witness has not been a first-hand observer 
 
187.  RICOEUR, Hermeneutics of Testimony, supra note 29, at 123. 
188.  GLORIA ANZALDÚA, BORDERLANDS / LA FRONTERA: THE NEW MESTIZA 72–73 
(1987). 
189.  Id. at 73; see also PARUSSA, supra note 138, at 126 (describing negotiation between 
subject and the surrounding world in the context of Judaism). 
190.  RICOEUR, Hermeneutic of Revelation, supra note 62, at 113. 
191.  See id. at 113–14. 
192.  Sarat, supra note 153, at 455 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FELMAN, Camus’ The 
Plague, supra note 139, at 101). 
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but has heard the story from one who was.  In this situation, for the 
listener, as for the primary witness, recollection is a process of discovery; 
knowledge is in process, it is evolving and happening.193 
The role of the witness thus takes many forms.  The literary witness 
has been variously identified as facilitator,194 “enabler of the 
testimony,”195 medium of story,196 shaman,197 and conduit.198  Narrative 
witnesses frequently will enter into the primary experience 
vicariously,199 thereby electing to become victims themselves.200  In some 
resistance narratives, the literary witness is said to speak in a collective 
voice201 and may, by deliberate choice, form an alliance with the primary 
subject with an explicit aim to make the relationship democratic.202  In 
many other contexts, the narrator conspires with a community to “pass 
on the collective wisdom” of the group.203 
To legitimize the testimony, and to ensure its authenticity, the 
narrative witness must incorporate experience from the Other’s 
experience, even in those cases in which the literary narrator is also a 
primary witness.204  Notably, for the literary writer who is a secondary 
witness, this willingness to engage the Other requires elimination of 
privileged aspects of discourse.205  Solidarity between the writer, who is 
letrado, or intellectual, and primary witness is essential.206  Their work 
together has been described as a dialectic between oppressor and 
oppressed,207 in which the testimonial novel becomes the “field of 
conflict.”208  In this sense, the work of literary witness is non-heroic;209 its 
 
193.  LAUB, Bearing Witness, supra note 137, at 62. 
194.  See FELMAN, Camus’ The Plague, supra note 139, at 109. 
195.  LAUB, Bearing Witness, supra note 137, at 58; see Wiesel, supra note 143, at 5. 
196.  STEELE, supra note 145, at 2. 
197.  ANZALDÚA, supra note 188, at 66. 
198.  CRAFT, supra note 28, at 20. 
199.  LAUB, Bearing Witness, supra note 137, at 57. 
200.  FELMAN, Camus’ The Plague, supra note 139, at 117–18 (describing the philosophy 
of Albert Camus). 
201.  Id. 
202.  CRAFT, supra note 28, at 21. 
203.  Doctorow, supra note 146, at 21. 
204.  See LAUB, Bearing Witness, supra note 137, at 58. 
205.  CRAFT, supra note 28, at 15. 
206.  Id. at 20. 
207.  See id. at 20. 
208.  Id. at 3–5. 
209.  Id. at 2 (examining the novels of Nobel laureate Rigoberta Menchú). 
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creation demands ego suppression in order that the solitary hero figure 
of the narrator disappears.210  It is more than just an intellectual alliance, 
then; the collaboration intentionally exposes—and exploits—the 
“connection between knowledge and power.”211 
Although much about this work is collaborative or communitarian, 
the burden of the narrative witness is nevertheless solitary.212  She 
speaks in her own language, disguised in “enlightened bias,”213 by means 
of connectivity that allows her to speak for and to others.214  Such work 
is not without hazards.  What the witness seeks to do may be nothing 
less than recreate the experience in text.215  Thus, there is a need to work 
out the ownership of truth216 as well as a constant struggle to resolve 
both the primary and secondary witnesses’ inability to say all or be 
completely true.217  The narrator must also deal with a confluence of 
roles: that of victim, witness, and judge.218  Finally, the witness, who has 
“had the privilege of surviving and who therefore ha[s] the responsibility 
. . . [of bearing] witness,” must find a way to survive the witnessing.219 
V. THE LITERARY TESTIMONIAL NARRATIVE AS A MODEL FOR 
LAWYERS 
Many parallels can be drawn between the work of narrative 
witnesses and that of civic-oriented lawyers.  In both fields can be found 
 
210.  Id. at 20–21.  This is similar to the position taken by Primo Levi, who saw himself 
not as a writer but as a person who happened to be a witness and was therefore called to 
speak.  Signorini, supra note 37, at 174, 183–84.  Invited to judge, Levi declined, preferring to 
serve only as the witness.  Id. at 180. 
211.  CRAFT, supra note 28, at 7 (quoting BARBARA HARLOW, RESISTANCE 
LITERATURE 116 (1987)) (internal quotation mark omitted); cf. Rice, supra note 39, at 3 
(describing interracial alliances in relation to anti-lynching efforts). 
212.  SHOSHANA FELMAN, Education and Crisis, or the Vicissitudes of Teaching 
[hereinafter FELMAN, Education and Crisis], in TESTIMONY, supra note 33, at 1, 3. 
213.  Doctorow, supra note 146, at 21. 
214.  FELMAN, Education and Crisis, supra note 212, at 3.  Although, as Albert Camus 
recognized, a witness cannot speak for all.  FELMAN, Camus’ The Plague, supra note 139, at 
118. 
215.  Rice, supra note 39, at 23. 
216.  COADY, supra note 12, ch. 4; WITNESSING LYNCHING, supra note 39, at 61. 
217.  SHOSHANA FELMAN, Camus’ The Fall, or the Betrayal of the Witness [hereinafter 
FELMAN, Camus’ The Fall], in TESTIMONY, supra note 33, at 165, 197 (failure of 
representation discussed in the context of Albert Camus’ novel The Fall); Signorini, supra 
note 37, at 177–78 (explicating Primo Levi’s struggles with this issue). 
218.  FELMAN, Camus’ The Fall, supra note 217, at 198. 
219.  PARUSSA, supra note 138, at 127; see also FELMAN, Camus’ The Fall, supra note 
217, at 195–96. 
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untold stories of silencing, oppression, and trauma.  Professionals in 
both fields confront many of the same issues, including the struggle with 
the dialectic between oppressor and oppressed, the ownership of truth, 
vicarious trauma, and authenticity of voice.  The testimonial discursive 
process utilized by and reflected on by writers is transferable to lawyers; 
the relationship aspects of literary narrative, in particular, are highly 
relevant.   
Moreover, both law and literature carry the scorings of a historical 
divide.  In literature, that divide placed literary fiction and poetry in 
opposition to history; in law, the divide separates common narrative 
from hard evidence.  In jurisprudence, as in history, the natural 
religions, and the sciences, “carefully managed circumstantial evidence” 
dominated the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries.220  In all 
these areas, but in law in particular, “a narrative arranged from 
circumstantial evidence became the most favored proof of all,”221 
overwhelming evidence of things not seen.222  In Robin West’s words, 
unquantifiable knowledge “acquired sympathetically” lost purchase, 
leading to the “incredibly exalted role we accord to rationality in 
modern legal discourse.”223  This bears noting because, as Tony Alfieri 
points out, lawyers’ failure to appreciate the widespread institutional 
subordination associated with such systemic conditions inevitably leads 
to frustration in the pursuit of more democratic legal process ideals.224   
In the literary narrative context, considerable strides have been 
made toward bridging the gap.  Many experts understand the function of 
literary genres to “mediate and explain intractable problems.”225  To 
some extent this involves attempting to discover what is “real” or to 
ascertain what is true, with heavy reliance on sympathetically acquired 
knowledge and with little or no regard for empirical evidence.  This is 
not to say such knowledge is fanciful or not fact-based.  Rather, 
according to novelist and essayist E.L. Doctorow, one way fiction 
mediates today’s world is by illuminating factual information so that it 
will be perceived.226 
 
220.  WELSH, supra note 134, at ix; see also Kadoch, supra note 63, at 3 (noting how the 
management of trial narrative occurred late in the development of trial process). 
221.  WELSH, supra note 134, at x. 
222.  Id. at xi. 
223.  WEST, supra note 1, at 325. 
224.  Alfieri, supra note 10, at 1462–63. 
225.  E.g., MCKEON, supra note 55, at 419.  
226.  Doctorow, supra note 146, at 24. 
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The same cannot be said of law.  In ways similar to those undertaken 
by literary witnesses, however, lawyers could shed light on hidden 
aspects of the justice system and our laws’ effects.  What is needed is a 
narrative construct, similar to that forged by literary narrators, that 
utilizes the experience, expertise, and privileged position of lawyers and 
does not dismiss the stories deemed immaterial by the judicial system or 
silence the voices of those most impacted by it. 
Even a superficial exploration of the legal milieu illuminates possible 
applications of literary witnessing theory to law.  First, there can be little 
doubt that modern law practice involves elements of story 
construction.227  This is true inside the courtroom, and it is true for law 
practice outside the courtroom as well.228  Story construction is a 
creative process, but while truth may be the hoped-for systemic 
outcome, truth may or may not be the goal of individuals involved in 
any story’s construction within the judicial system.  Story can be 
purposefully manipulated,229 or the system may unintentionally 
constrain accuracy and affect trustworthiness.  At the level of legal 
judgments, where modern trial narrative is structured by rules of 
evidence,230 reliability may be sorely lacking even when eyewitness 
testimony is utilized.231 
 
227.  At one time, lawyers’ roles in practice were far more “amorphous and diverse.” 
C.W. Brooks, The Common Lawyers in England, c. 1558–1642, in LAWYERS IN EARLY 
MODERN EUROPE AND AMERICA 42, 42 (Wilfrid Prest ed., 1981).  For an examination of 
lawyers’ roles in early Anglo-American history, see Stephen Botein, The Legal Profession in 
Colonial North America, in LAWYERS IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE AND AMERICA, supra, 
at 129. 
228.  Christine B. Harrington, Outlining a Theory of Legal Practice, in LAWYERS IN A 
POSTMODERN WORLD: TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION 49, 63 (Maureen Cain & 
Christine B. Harrington eds., 1994) (asserting that the whole “concept of legal practice . . . 
should be treated as . . . historical construction”). 
229.  This is common in litigation in the United States and elsewhere and an almost 
inevitable consequence of an adversary system.  See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 11, at 58.  
Richard Weisberg explores the destructive capacity of language and story construction in an 
examination of lawyers’ work in Vichy France that resulted in the deportation and deaths of 
many Jews.  See RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND 
LITERATURE 143–75 (1992).  
230.  Kadoch, supra note 63, at 8. 
231.  COADY, supra note 12, at 262–64 (discussing studies concerning eyewitness 
unreliability, including problems with empiricism).  See generally RALPH NORMAN HABER & 
MAURICE HERSHENSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VISUAL PERCEPTION (2d ed. 1980); 
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1996); EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., 1984); Peter J. 
Graham, The Reliability of Testimony, 61 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 695 (2000); D. 
Michael Risinger, Michael J. Saks, William C. Thompson & Robert Rosenthal, The 
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Opportunities to create testimonial narrative in service of truth do 
exist in law, however, and a literary model of witnessing can be used in 
the courtroom setting.  As Drucilla Cornell has pointed out, there are 
two audiences for every legal act: present and future.232  For this reason, 
lawyers may make strategic choices with testimony to impact the future 
of law as well as the outcome of a case.233  Thus lawyers, as well as 
courageous courtroom witnesses, can engage in the struggle for justice 
through the strategic use of testimony.  The testimonial codes of a 
courtroom can be challenged by a witness for the sake of truth and 
history.234  Austin Sarat has demonstrated, for example, how death 
penalty lawyers not only operate to resist injustice through conventional 
testimony but also generate testimonial narratives with a goal toward 
the future where, by virtue of transcripts and other documentation, 
present injustice will be remembered.235  Indeed, it may well be that, 
more important than restoring the public’s sense of justice, a public trial 
can safeguard collective memory.236  While far from the norm, this 
approach to the lawyer’s role within the confines of the judicial system is 
consistent with the aims of testimonial narrative. 
The advantages of broadening perspectives both on testimonial 
narrative (to embrace the participation of lawyers as public citizens) and 
on conceptions of lawyering roles (to include testimonial narrative 
outside the courtroom) are many.  An “ideological conception of legal 
 
Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of 
Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
232.  Sarat, supra note 153, at 453–54 (citing Drucilla Cornell, From the Lighthouse: The 
Promise of Redemption and the Possibility of Legal Interpretation, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1687 
(1990)).  It has been noted that the most remembered, and, therefore, arguably the most 
important, cases in history are those in which the judgments have been seriously questioned.  
Doctorow, supra note 146, at 23. 
233.  Sarat, supra note 153, at 455–56, 463, makes the case that storytelling of the type 
permitted in mitigation in capital cases should be utilized more broadly.  
234.  One example is reported by Dorothy Rabinowitz.  Rabinowitz, supra note 159, at 
37.  Rabinowitz notes, in the years following World War II, Holocaust survivors learned that 
the public and the courts could tolerate only so much truth.  Id. at 35–36.  Many survivors, if 
they told their stories at all, grew accustomed to speaking with the clinical detachment of 
professional witnesses.  Id.  In one case involving the potential deportation of a former Nazi 
believed to have been responsible for many murders, one woman challenged the implicit 
narrative expectations.  Id. at 37.  Having heard historical facts denied, and truth mangled, 
she testified according to her own conscience, in defiance of courtroom protocols.  Id.  She 
thereby made accessible real experiences that had rarely found expression in a U.S. court 
setting.  Id. 
235.  Sarat, supra note 153, at 454–63. 
236.  See Signorini, supra note 37, at 179. 
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practice,” as opposed to one confined to functional and structural 
definitions, takes note of and analyzes consequences of lawyering 
work.237  This alone might reinforce the idea of an expanded role 
definition.  Perhaps more importantly, however, narrative work, as 
critical legal theory, narrative theory, and law and humanities have 
illuminated, is closely associated with the work of humanists and 
humanitarians,238 and just as literature can elucidate minority and 
discounted positions, the literary or narrative form can be used to 
expose the relationship between law and justice.239  The “sympathetic 
judgment” demanded of those engaged in narrative is apt to lead to a 
search for the causes of suffering and motivate action in eradicating 
suffering.240  Those causes are likely to be tied into institutional injustice 
and inequality. 
This is not to say that narrative in law is identical to literary 
narrative.  Limited opportunity exists to fully engage in narrative within 
the confines of the judicial system.  Limits within the system exist in part 
because the legal context always involves the application of state-
sanctioned authority.  Additionally, law is embedded in its own 
normative codes.  Within this context, certain narratives are assumed 
and many are excluded.241  Courts use power to limit the number of 
voices that have access to justice, thereby suppressing the possibilities 
for communal participation in law-making.242  
Judges, however, do not have to limit voices; they can exercise their 
power to admit other voices.243  Nor is it only judges who have the 
authority to control or broaden a narrative; practicing lawyers have 
been vested with considerable authority as well.  And lawyers are not 
 
237.  Harrington, supra note 228, at 63. 
238.  See KIERAN DOLIN, FICTION AND THE LAW: LEGAL DISCOURSE IN VICTORIAN 
AND MODERNIST LITERATURE 8 (1999).  Dolin also notes that James Boyd White sees law, 
like literature, as an interpretive and rhetorical enterprise, a “culture of argument.”  Id. 
(quoting JAMES BOYD WHITE, Reading Law and Reading Literature: Law as Language, in 
HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 77, 78–79 (1985)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
239.  Id. at 8–9 (citing WEISBERG, supra note 229). 
240.  WEST, supra note 1, at 326. 
241.  Cover, supra note 15, cited in DOLIN, supra note 238, at 10.  In effect, Cover was 
witnessing in a way quite similar to biblical prophets.   
242.  DOLIN, supra note 238, at 14. 
243.  See id. at 11.  Dolin places Cover in the company of theorists in social sciences, 
such as Clifford Geertz, Hayden White, and Louis O. Mink, who see narrative as way to make 
sense of social realities.  Id. 
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limited to the confines of the judicial system in the telling of justice 
stories.  Practicing lawyers, in fact, to a far greater extent than judges, 
can act as citizens outside case- and court-related boundaries.244  
Lawyers are particularly well positioned to engage in social narrative; 
they have some control over public legal consciousness by virtue of the 
fact that they are continuous players in the operative systems, allowing 
them to have significant input into how language is created, translated, 
and then re-created into meta-language.245 
Essayists Stephen Trimble and Terry Tempest Williams, writing 
about Utah’s wilderness lands in a concerted effort to preserve those 
lands, provide a useful example of witnessing within and outside of the 
confines of normative legal discourse.  In the struggle to create 
Yellowstone National Park, they report, advocates used “scientific 
evidence, lyrical descriptions, and—above all—the stunningly powerful 
photographs of William Henry Jackson and the lush painting of Thomas 
Moran” to persuade Congress of the need for protective legislation.246  
Similarly, Martha Minow describes early work of Gary Bellow and 
California farmworkers in which the workers confronted public utilities 
providers at a community meeting with “proof” of below-standard 
potable water in the form of individual stories and individually gathered 
bottles of filthy water.247  The underlying causes were corrected and the 
affected households were compensated for past damages.248  The lawyers 
in these situations stood ready to act as lawyers, but legal machinations 
did not move the process of change—stories did.  Lawyers, as citizens, 
always have this kind of option. 
There are sound justifications for a movement toward citizen–lawyer 
witnessing.  Just as some literary narrativists see the role of witness as a 
moral responsibility, many members of the legal profession are guided 
in their work by personal moral codes.  In the literary field are many 
writers who have acknowledged being motivated, if only partially, by 
 
244.  As Christine Harrington notes, lawyers “construct ideologies about law for 
different audiences.”  Harrington, supra note 228, at 57.  Lawyer–client relationships, she 
further says, are only “one arena.”  Id. 
245.  Id. at 56. 
246.  T.H. Watkins, Introduction: Bearing Witness, in TESTIMONY: WRITERS OF THE 
WEST SPEAK ON BEHALF OF UTAH WILDERNESS 9, 9–10 (Stephen Trimble & Terry 
Tempest Williams eds., 1996). 
247.  Martha Minow, Political Lawyering: An Introduction, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
287, 287–88 (1996). 
248.  Id. 
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religious injunctions.  “Remember and observe” is the command from 
the Torah that Elie Wiesel responds to.249  According to Rosetta Ross, 
the civil rights activism of the latter twentieth century reflected 
everyday, religiously grounded practices of witnessing and testifying.250  
At the very least, says Franca Signorini, witnesses to traumatizing events 
benefit from comparisons to biblical witnesses, who had the ability to 
perceive signs; like the biblical models, testimonial narrators in the 
modern world present a “disturbing and disquieting mirror” of the rest 
of humanity.251  They represent neither saints nor demons, but people 
like everyone else.252  
Other—perhaps many more—testimonial writers rely on more 
generalized notions of moral necessity.  “I owe them my roots and 
memory.  I am duty-bound to serve as their emissary,” Elie Wiesel 
reflects.253  Not to tell, he says, would be perjury.254  Albert Camus 
speaks more generally of an obligation to make a moral act out of every 
publication.255  Such motives are familiar to many lawyers who, similarly, 
are guided in their work by moral and even religious principles.256 
Lawyers, in addition to sharing the same or similar values held by 
testimonial writers, must abide by professional standards of ethical 
conduct.  An awareness of these moral, ethical, and professional 
responsibilities informs lawyers’ forays into narrative witnessing.  The 
ethical foundations of witnessing for lawyers are different and in some 
 
249.  Wiesel, supra note 143, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
250.  ROSS, supra note 142, at 223. 
251.  Signorini, supra note 37, at 185–86. 
252.  Id. at 186. 
253.  FELMAN, Camus’ The Plague, supra note 139, at 116 (quoting Elie Wiesel, Why I 
Write, in CONFRONTING THE HOLOCAUST: THE IMPACT OF ELIE WIESEL 200, 202 (Alvin H. 
Rosenfeld & Irving Greenberg eds., 1978)). 
254.  FELMAN, Return of the Voice, supra note 33, at 204 (citing to Elie Wiesel); see also 
Signorini, supra note 37, at 174 (attributing similar views to Primo Levi). 
255.  See FELMAN, Camus’ The Plague, supra note 139, at 114. 
256.  See Joseph Allegretti, Lawyers, Clients, and Covenant: A Religious Perspective on 
Legal Practice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101 (1998); Daniel O. Conkle, Professing 
Professionals: Christian Pilots on the River of Law, 38 CATH. LAW. 151, 167–72 (1998); Larry 
O. Natt Gantt, II, Integration as Integrity: Postmodernism, Psychology, and Religion on the 
Role of Moral Counseling in the Attorney–Client Relationship, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 233 
(2004); Bruce A. Green, The Religious Lawyering Critique, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 283 (2006); 
Azizah al-Hibri, On Being a Muslim Corporate Lawyer, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 947, 961 
(1996) (“[R]eligion subconsciously informs our individual professional practice . . . .”); see 
also Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 
443, 453 (1999) (observing that although they have not “embraced religion,” the authors have 
been “powerfully influenced by it”). 
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respects more complicated.  The Model Rules of Professional 
Responsibility lay the groundwork; the Preamble to the Model Rules 
directly addresses the role of lawyer as “public citizen having special 
responsibility for the quality of justice.”257  Among other things, the 
Rules direct that a lawyer “should cultivate knowledge of the law 
beyond its use for clients” and “employ that knowledge in reform of the 
law.”258  Lawyers’ professional values, therefore, not only allow for a 
witnessing role outside the judicial context but support such a role.  
Addressing the normative bases for rights and duties of legal 
educators to speak out, Robert Kuehn notes, first, that lawyers are well 
positioned to address social and political problems in society, their 
educational, practice, and professional cultural backgrounds having 
prepared them to do just that.259  In addition, he points out, the norms of 
the legal profession include not only pro bono service but a duty to 
improve the law and legal systems.260  Thus, a lawyer is clearly justified 
in seeking a forum in which to meet these responsibilities. 
The ways in which lawyers may meet their obligations to the 
profession, the community, and society are not specified, but neither are 
such roles historically predetermined or decreed.261  Certainly, bearing 
witness to the conditions of clients’ lives and the state of law in 
operation fits within the expectations.  It is a way to recognize that law is 
a service occupation262 and to recognize that legal systems intersect and 
often overlap with political systems.263  Indeed, it is a particularly 
effective way.264 
 
257.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (1983). 
258.  Id. 
259.  Robert R. Kuehn, A Normative Analysis of the Rights and Duties of Law 
Professors to Speak Out, 55 S.C. L. REV. 253, 254 (2003).  Kuehn further observes that “[l]aw 
professors, too, have stepped out of the classroom . . . to address perceived injustices.”  
Id. at 255. 
260.  Id. at 274–76. 
261.  Harrington, supra note 228, at 59 (citing William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in 
Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 469 (1984)). 
262.  See, e.g., Stuart Scheingold, The Contradictions of Radical Law Practice, in 
LAWYERS IN A POSTMODERN WORLD: TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION, supra note 
228, at 265, 270 (noting that “the premise of liberal lawyering is that clients have interests as 
well as disputes”). 
263.  Scheingold, for example, talks about lawyers who seek “to combine political 
sensitivity with a conventional sense of professional responsibility.”  Id. at 269. 
264.  See, e.g., WEISBERG, supra note 229, at 251 (“Stories about law. . . provide a 
unique source of understanding, likely to bring a greater ethical awareness to late twentieth-
century legal communication.”).  It might even be seen as an imperative.  See PARUSSA, supra 
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VI. THE CALL TO WITNESS 
Whether understood as elemental to ethical or moral obligations, 
conceived of as a means of achieving social justice, or simply viewed as a 
needed adjunct to legal proceedings in the public space, the idea of 
lawyers as witnesses to some degree ultimately is about a relationship to 
truth.  What “truth” is, of course, is a metaphysical question beyond 
resolution, yet the pursuit of truth is nonetheless an aspect of lawyering 
work.  Accordingly, some exploration of what is meant by “truth” is 
warranted. 
This is Truth: , so is this: , this:  , and this: .265 
The primary meaning of “true,” the adjective, is “faithful; loyal; 
constant.”266  Its etymological root is the word for “tree,”267 a fact that is 
significant conceptually, since it suggests that truth, while stable, is not 
unchanging or immutable.  “Truth” is also etymologically related to the 
word “trim,” with its alternative, ambiguous meanings, “to prepare; fit 
out; dress” (as in trim a turkey or a Christmas tree) and “to put in 
proper order; make neat or tidy” (as in trim a mustache or a bush).268  
Thus, truth might be described as a tidy growth of collective 
understandings which, taken as a whole, stands the test of time and the 
onslaughts of contradictions.  There is both ambiguity and irony here, 
but the tree—whether trim as in dressed up, or trim as in tidied up—is, 
nevertheless, a useful symbol for truth. 
The etymology of the word should be kept in mind while considering 
a cultural manifestation of truth’s centrality to narrative in law.  An 
often acknowledged mandate that supports narrative witnessing is the 
lawyers’ oath.  Many of the oaths lawyers take for admission to a state 
 
note 138, at 26 (reflecting on role of “those who have had the privilege of surviving and who 
therefore have the responsibility of bearing witness and putting history back into motion”).  
265.  Gurica, Clip Art of Tree, OPENCLIPART (Feb. 27, 2009), https://openclipart.org/det
ail/21735/tree, archived at https://perma.cc/UP5D-U5QM; Jykhui, Clip Art of Red Aifowers 
Tree, OPENCLIPART (June 8, 2013), https://openclipart.org/detail/179135/red-aifowers-tree, 
archived at https://perma.cc/D78G-T2SG; Merlin2525, Clip Art of Winter Tree 1, 
OPENCLIPART (Jan. 9, 2012), https://openclipart.org/detail/166963/winter-tree-1, archived at 
https://perma.cc/25C8-4UBK; Stevepetmonkey, Clip Art of Palm Tree, OPENCLIPART (Sept. 
25, 2010), https://openclipart.org/detail/86761/palm-tree, archived at https://perma.cc/BMZ4-
RQ7T. 
266.  WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 1563. 
267.  Id. 
268.  Id. at 1557. 
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bar include a promise to “do no falsehood.”269  This promissory language 
dates back at least 350 years, to the earliest recorded lawyers’ oaths in 
England.270  In the United States, as recently as 1908 a Model Oath was 
on same the footing as the Model Rules’ precursor, the ABA Canons of 
Professional Conduct.271  The oath, in fact, may be the key connector 
between the lawyer’s role as advocate and the lawyer’s role as public 
citizen, between courtroom narrative and testimony, between 
storytelling and truth. 
The exact origins of oaths are unknown, but the oath is an ancient 
tradition.  Indeed, a “belief in the self-operative magic of the oath” 
preceded even the belief in the oath as a harbinger of divine 
intervention.272  “The oath was a self-curse, uttered in conditional form, 
operating irrevocably upon occurrence of the condition.”273  It later 
evolved into a call on a Supreme Being to witness, punish, or both if 
spoken words proved false.274  Throughout early Anglo history, the oath 
operated as a means of social control.275 
What the Germanic tribes brought to the practice of oath taking was 
a different conception of truth.  Their notion of truth corresponded to a 
condition of having prevailed; the spoken oath was an expression of 
solidarity with those whose success gave them power.276  In the German 
tradition, the oath carried no presumption of, or even association with, 
knowledge.277 
As a result, as the northern European cultures began to merge, the 
oath underwent a transformation.278  In the early Middle Ages, in 
Anglo-Saxon legal culture, the oath was sometimes the judgment itself, 
still very much operating as truth per se.279  But by the late Middle Ages, 
 
269.  Carol Rice Andrews, The Lawyer’s Oath: Both Ancient and Modern, 22 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 3, 4 (2009). 
270.  Id.  
271.  Id. at 43.  Shortly before the ABA Canons were replaced by the Model Rules in 
the early 1980s, some minor changes were made to the Model Oath.  Id. at 43–44.  Ethics 
compilations no longer include the Model Oath, but it has not been repealed.  Id.  
272.  Helen Silving, The Oath (pt. 1), 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1363 (1959). 
273.  Id. at 1330. 
274.  Andrews, supra note 269, at 7. 
275.  Silving, supra note 272, at 1389. 
276.  Id. at 1340. 
277.  Id. at 1334, 1345. 
278.  See id. at 1361–63. 
279.  Id. at 1362. 
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oaths, as a general matter, had taken on more characteristics of a 
promise, a personal assurance of future truthful or honest conduct.280  
Changing social conditions, more democratic social power 
structures, and cognitive, technological, and scientific advances affected 
the population’s interface with objective realities.281  The merger of 
continental inquisitorial practices with the British Isles’ tradition of 
appeals to superhuman powers meant a still potent but largely 
undefined oath was operating in the courts.  Ultimately, the oath 
became a promise to tell what was in the witness’s own knowledge.282  
This, then, came to represent truth. 
For the last several centuries, since the advent of evidence laws, the 
emphasis of in-court testimony has been on such “knowledge” or “true 
representations” of the acts described.283  This differs markedly from 
what preceded and reflects the growth of probabilistic thinking in late 
Renaissance Europe.284  Initially, evidence law proponents and 
commentators did not see evidence as divorced from the oath and its 
claims to knowledge based in religion and human morality,285 but the 
move from intangible proof to empirical evidence coincidentally 
impacted understandings of truth.286  The “modern regard for the 
evidence of things” meant a complementary distrust in representations 
of things not seen or quantified.287  The oath lost its super-utilitarian 
function.  Over time, there were many calls to abandon the oath as 
irrational, based as it was on long-ago abandoned ideas of humanity’s 
relationship to the supernatural.288 
The oath was not abandoned, however.  In the late nineteenth 
century, evidence scholar Simon Greenleaf observed that a shift had 
been made: a courtroom witness taking an oath no longer called on God 
as witness; rather, the oath was a way to call on the witness to be 
 
280.  Id. at 1352. 
281.  Cf. HELEN SILVING, SOURCES OF LAW 15 (1968). 
282.  Silving, supra note 272, 1347–48.  
283.  WELSH, supra note 134, at 10–11. 
284.  Id. at 11. 
285.  Kadoch, supra note 63, at 6. 
286.  As Kadoch notes, the early tolerance for reliance on intangible proof in 
conjunction with reliance on “hard” evidence was later criticized.  Id. at 6–7.  At the same 
time, John Locke wrote of how reliance on testimony in court was limiting to history.  JOHN 
LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. IV, ch. 16, § 11, at 664 
(Peter H. Nidditch ed., 1975). 
287.  WELSH, supra note 134, at 12. 
288.  Silving, supra note 272, at 1357–58, 1389. 
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conscious of God.289  Similarly, but more broadly, Wigmore noted the 
value of the oath as promoting a witness’s awareness of “superhuman 
moral retribution.”290  Thus, the oath continued to be utilized, if only for 
whatever value could be gleaned from sending a message to witnesses 
that their testimony was a grave undertaking.291  It is noteworthy that 
the oath is still recognized as significant, solemn if not sacred.292  The 
apparent significance of oaths declined,293 but the power of the oath did 
not disappear; it simply went underground. 
Where this dive into legal and literary history leads is to a suggestion 
that the inherent promise of the oath took root in literary narrative.  It is 
as if, for several centuries, literary narrators have been the guardians of 
the solemn promise needed to “well serve our best understanding of our 
true human needs.”294  Lawyers who seek to honor that promise, then, 
may find guidance from the literary field and role models in literary 
narrative witnesses. 
Centuries ago, the perceived presence of an all-knowing authority 
pervaded everyday life; the role of witness was to communicate its 
presence.  The singular function of witnesses was to take an oath; there 
was no narration.  After the Norman Invasion, jurors were charged with 
ascertaining the story behind a case, but there was as yet no courtroom 
narrative.  Over time, juror and witness roles developed and then 
diverged, ultimately leading to the kind of in-court testimony with which 
western societies are now familiar.  Courtroom narrative was very 
quickly circumscribed, however, in part to rein in long, untidy stories.  
More to the point, the role of story narration was not entrusted to 
witnesses, who had, through the practice of wagering law, shown 
fallibility and disrespect for the oath. 
 
289.  1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 364a, at 504 
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co., 16th ed. 1899), cited in Silving, supra note 272, at 1371. 
290.  6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF 
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1816, at 285–86 (3rd ed. 1940), quoted in Silving, 
supra note 272, at 1371.  Silving calls this “civil blackmail.”  Silving, supra note 272, at 1389 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
291.  Silving, supra note 272, at 1371. 
292.  Andrews, supra note 269, at 55. 
293.  See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATURAL SCIENCE, 
RELIGION, HISTORY, LAW, AND LITERATURE 141–44 (1983) (describing the conflict over 
the relative values of eyewitness testimony and traditional reliance on attested documents). 
294.  WEST, supra note 1, at 7. 
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The desire for control over irrepressible testimony heralded the 
introduction of evidentiary constraints.  The modern judicial system 
quickly constricted the range of oral testimony, not only prescribing the 
witness’s narrative framework but ultimately attenuating the gravity of 
the oath-taking act.  By the seventeenth century, reliance on external 
evidence signaled the decline of essentialist authority, heralding the 
transformation from metaphysics and theology to epistemology.295  The 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw a “change in attitudes about 
how truth and virtue are most authentically signified.”296 
Meanwhile, advances in record collection and preservation brought 
inflated confidence in eyewitness testimony and documentary 
materials,297 and rationalism became the buzzword of intellectual circles 
in the seventeenth century.298  Judicial procedure emphasized the logical 
content of human speech, so much so that the preternatural quality of 
the oath was all but forgotten.299  In the end, formal completion of 
judicial process was emphasized over virtuous certainty, with loss to 
story in the judicial system.  Story narration was slowly given over to the 
expanding field of literature.  “Romance” and “history” developed, 
“rooted in the empirical” yet still “empowered by an essentialist 
authority.”300 
Now, society “runs on empirical thinking and precise calculations.”301  
Knowledge has taken on a character of infinite process, which results 
not just in quantitative changes in knowledge but the qualitative 
transformation of history.302  In such a world, it appears that “[t]o be 
saved by a transcendent Truth requires the increasingly separable and 
prior act of being empirically convinced of it.”303  But through this 
movement away from a priori authority as the center of knowledge, we 
have also come to the understanding that truth does not exist outside 
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the early thirteenth century.  LE GOFF, supra note 60, at 75.  Previously, in ancient Greece, 
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63.  With the advent of documentation, they became archivists.  Id. 
298.  LE GOFF, supra note 60, at 149, 194–95. 
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300.  MCKEON, supra note 55, at 38. 
301.  Doctorow, supra note 146, at 17. 
302.  LE GOFF, supra note 60, at 115. 
303.  MCKEON, supra note 55, at 83 (discussing claims respecting the “truth” of 
scriptures). 
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power, as some eternal, neutral given waiting to be discovered.304  In 
other words, there are no facts in themselves, divorced from meaning; 
for a fact to exist, meaning must be introduced.305  Neither truth nor 
meaning is static or unassailable; moreover, a responsiveness is called 
for.306  In such an environment, witnesses are needed, more than ever.   
A marriage of the rational, empirical side of thought with the 
intuitive, story-oriented side is long overdue.  The conceptual duality 
that has pitted the tangible-empirical against the intangible-imaginative 
for two hundred years is certainly more of a tension than a divide.  
Addressing this issue, Parussa explains: 
The point is not to concentrate on the threat that imagination 
may pose to the integrity of historical narratives but to move 
from historical events to the explanations and knowledge that 
are created through the narration of events—and, at the same 
time, to move to a kind of narrative that incorporates historical 
facts without denying the existence and the importance of the 
subjective gaze.307 
He is speaking of an evolutionary process, a progression of events 
that moves from a cognitive understanding to an interpretation of 
events, then proceeds to a narrative of those events which includes both 
deliberate choice and placement of known facts and some injection of 
meaning.  This constitutes, as he notes, “a difficult but vital exercise of 
mediation between history and imagination: an act of ethical 
responsibility toward the historical past as well as an act of free 
imagination and preparation of the future that lies ahead.”308 
Again, the integration of apparent opposites is deeply embedded in 
both history and mythology.  History, we now understand, nourishes 
memory.309  “[M]emory ends where history begins”; conversely, history 
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begins where memory fades.310  In ancient Greece, memory, the raw 
material of history, took the form of a goddess.  Mnemosyne, daughter 
of Uranus, god of the heavens, and, by Zeus, mother of the muses, had 
two roles: to preserve human heroic deeds and to preside over lyric 
poetry.311  She is also credited with inventing words and language.312  She 
thus represents the bridge between history and literature, between what 
happens and what is told, between reality and truth.  The goddess, it has 
been said, revealed the secrets of the past to the poet.313 
The concept of divine revelation in Greek mythology has a parallel 
in biblical texts, where truth is passed from an omnipotent God to the 
prophet.  A paradox is presented in each context: that poetic discourse 
may be closer to the truth than descriptive discourse.  In Paul Ricoeur’s 
words, “the poetic[, or literary,] function incarnates a concept of 
truth.”314  It seems, then, that mythos is the way to true mimesis; a 
literary presentation of reality, rather than a “slavish imitation” of 
chronology and factual detail, transports listeners and readers across 
time and precipitates a metamorphosis.315  This is the function of 
witness. 
Considered in this way, the act of witness “belongs to the tragic 
destiny of truth.”316  The witness therefore has the responsibility of 
ensuring that truth is ethically framed by committing narrative to 
memory and memory to history.317  While the narrowness of the modern 
witness’s narrative role seems out of synch with the increasing reliance 
on external proof that coincided with the passing of the medieval era, it 
may, in fact, reflect the most powerful underlying convictions of that 
early age.  Lawyers have the ability to contribute to the revival of the 
power of witnessing, simply “trust[ing] that the story is powerful enough 
to transform.”318  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The work that lawyers do has not only legal and ethical implications, 
but political, social, and moral implications as well.  Their position in the 
social order provides lawyers with the opportunity, and in fact a 
privileged position from which, to testify.  While law affords some clues 
as to how this might be accomplished, narrative theories provide 
significantly greater guidance.  They can instruct our ideas about how 
we relate to client populations, especially those least well served by the 
existing judicial system.  Moreover, they provide strategies for 
communicating and otherwise breaching the gaps between what is 
experienced and what is understood by the community to be truth.  At 
its simplest, the final conclusion is the proposition that as lawyers we 
should take a serious look at the role of witnesses in society, not in the 
isolated and confining context of the judicial system but in the 
community at large, where we all have an interest in, and responsibility 
for, nurturing truth.   
What ensures truth-telling in this vision?  Is there a way to make 
storytelling “as valuable as a club or a sharpened bone” as it perhaps 
was in the past?319  The answer, as I have tendered, may lie in the 
ancient rite of moral obligation that was once depended upon to ensure 
truth-telling: the oath.  While narrative theory is emphasized in the 
analysis of witness role and method, this essential historical element in 
both law and religion brings the discussion full circle.  It is not just the 
act of bearing witness to what is seen, heard, or experienced by virtue of 
lawyers’ professional privileges that can make a difference, but the 
promise of truth—a covenant, a sacred oath—that signals and 
constitutes a return to authentic witnessing. 
The “Call to Witness” is an entreaty to look to stories and narratives, 
acts of witness in both fictional and nonfictional forms, for a partial 
answer to the questions posed by Robin West a decade ago.  Narratives 
bring to light the real conflicts underlying court cases and law, the 
motives that are dismissed as irrelevant, and the ever-present ambiguity 
of circumstances.  Picking up at key moments in time before or after the 
law is invoked, stories demonstrate the consequences of our actions and 
the agonizing responsibilities of choice.  These are the stories people 
often want to tell but cannot, and the stories people are afraid to tell but 
recognize as crucial.  Using literary narrative witnessing strategies, 
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lawyers can shed light on hidden aspects of the justice system and our 
laws’ effects.  Thus witness—the authorship of testimony—is still an 
appropriate concept for the conscientious care of memory and truth.  
The memory that is maintained through testimony, and the truth that is 
thereby shaped, can only serve justice, however, if the testimony is 
formative, and not just informative. 
